Intelligence Bulletin

JUNE 1946

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - WAR DEPARTMENT - WASHINGTON D. C.

RESTRICTED

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For explanation of distribution formula, see SM 21–6.

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COVER ILLUSTRATION: On the night of 28–29 July 1943, the 4th Tabor, a unit of Goumiers attached to the U. S. 1st Infantry Division, received orders to occupy an enemy-held mountain. The attack up the mountain was a particularly bloody one, made in the face of severe German machine gun and mortar fire. But in the words of the French after-action report: "The attack was pressed home, and the position stormed. Some of the enemy may have escaped. No prisoners were taken. Mission accomplished." The story of these Goumiers may be found on page 1.

Moroccan Goums

Scouting and patrolling come naturally to the small infantry reconnaissance units, known as Goums, which are recruited by the French among the hillmen of Morocco. Goums fought with the French Army in Tunisia, Corsica, Italy, and Southern France, and were attached to American forces in Tunisia and Sicily. The individual Goumiers are fierce Mohammedans with a very warlike tradition. Primitive lives in the rugged Atlas Mountains have made them hardy. They can climb mountains like goats, and are particularly adept at night fighting. Dressed in dark, loose-fitting, hooded robes, they can squat motionless like rocks; on sandaled feet they move with little noise. They carry American small arms, but prefer the *koumia*, a 10-inch knife with which they are reputed to behead their foes.

As early as the Tunisian Campaign they became almost legendary figures, greatly feared by the Germans. The Italians were so mortally terrified of the "Marocchini" that once in the Mateur-Bizerte sector, where Goums were attached to the U. S. 9th Infantry Division, three Italian companies surrendered en masse as soon as they heard that the troops in front of them were Goums. The success the Goums enjoyed, and the usefulness of their operations, underlines the importance of scouting ability on the part of the individual soldier.

The organization, training, and equipment of the Goumiers is all directed towards making the most of their natural characteristics. They are used in small groups, are lightly equipped, and are capable of rapid movement in rough mountain country.

← *During World War II, most Goumiers were armed with American equipment. This individual, typical of his race, carries an '03 rifle and an old-style U. S. bayonet. The helmet is not ordinarily worn by these troops.*

Goums are infantry companies of 165 natives, 6 French noncommissioned officers, and 1 [1] French officer. Each Goum is divided into 3 rifle platoons, a machine gun and mortar platoon, and a train of 20 mules.

Four Goums constitute a *Tabor*, or battalion. Each Tabor has a cavalry platoon for messenger and scout duty.

Three Tabors form a *Mehalla*, or group, but a Tabor or even a Goum is usually attached directly to an infantry division for reconnaissance use.

French officers and NCOs of the Goums speak the native tongue and use it in all their commands. French NCOs are all sergeants or above; they wear Sam Browne belts and are saluted. During the War, some Goum lieutenants were Moroccans, as were most of the NCOs. A native sergeant—*Moquaddem*—or corporal—*Maoun*—could give orders, but could not impose punishment. This was a needed precaution against their cruelty.

The World War II organization of the Goums represents a marked increase over their peacetime strength. General Guillaume, who commanded the Goumiers in Italy, had already introduced the Tabor organization in 1938, however, and also increased materially the size of each Goum. At that time there were also two Goums of "Saharan pattern" with horses and camels for use in rapid displacements. Animals were for transportation only; the Goumier has always fought on foot.

"Goum" means family or clan, and was originally a unit of about a hundred men from the same tribe. Since the French first arrived in Morocco in 1912, they have used Goums as a sort of police force. Their French commanders were officers of the Bureau of Native Affairs, and administered the clan from which their men were drawn. It was soon found desirable to recruit not more than one-third of each Goum locally, and the other two-thirds from "foreign" tribes. This ensured that blood-ties would not interfere too much with peacetime police functions.

Thus it is that Goumiers are substantially irregular troops more after the nature of home guard soldiers. Their organization is based essentially on the village. In wartime, the men are mobilized within a few hours notice by the French Bureau of Native Affairs officers, who abandon their governmental duties for this purpose. In view of their irregular status, the Goums are among the first units to start demobilizing at the end of hostilities. The number at present on active service probably does not exceed some 2,000.

During World War II, Goumiers used less American matériel and equipment than other French Army units. Much of their clothing was their own, although their turbans and *djeballahs*, or flowing, hooded robes, were designed by each commanding officer to distinguish their own Goum, and were furnished by the French authorities. Their san-

[1] During World War II, commissioned strength of a Goum normally was increased to four officers.

Goumiers are tough, Berber tribesmen from the hill country of Morocco. They are particularly adept at night fighting, scouting, and patrolling. They prefer sandals to U. S. style shoes.

dals, and the curved knives dangling from their belts, were personal property. Mounted men owned their own horses. Goumiers liked the Allied equipment they used very much. The Goums drew a small number of jeeps, which provided the native hillmen the first automobile rides of their lives and delighted them hugely. With robes flying and wearing happy grins, they were an incongruous sight as they tore along the roads. They used British Sten guns, American rifles, Model 1903, and any hand grenades they could obtain. Much American equipment the Goumiers did not need. They had little use for steel helmets, and they normally spurned shoes, tents, and blankets. As they were Mohammedans, no one fed them Spam. They did not like C rations either, but were adept at foraging. For fresh meat they had sheep driven behind them—or ahead of them, through minefields. Their favorite drink was tea.

Goumiers shave the head as a part of their religion. In this picture, the machine guns are U. S. Brownings, the rifles are 8-mm Mannlicher-Berthier carbines.

Moroccans are not Arabs, but are members of the white race; they belong to a people known as Berbers. When corsairs sailed the seas, this people gave its name to the "Barbary Coast" of North Africa. Berbers have coffee-colored skins, and brown or hazel eyes. A few are blonde; but most have dark brown hair. Many are bearded; to wear a beard and to carry arms are signs of manhood among them. Characteristically, they are lean and tall. Their Mohammedan faith prescribes a fatalistic attitude towards death, and as a rule, Moroccans use no alcohol. Their observances include shaving the top of the head and wearing a pigtail, which the Prophet can grab when he reaches down to pull them up to heaven. Their religion is not orthodox, however. Berbers are not polygamous, like Arabs, and their women go unveiled. Moroccan women accompany the Goums in the field as officially recognized camp followers.

Berbers have an extremely warlike tradition. The Barbary pirates levied tribute on England, France, and the Italian states; they levied tribute on the distant United States until Stephen Decatur taught them better. They were greatly outnumbered by the Arabs, and in the course of many wars most were pushed out of Algeria and the Moroccan plains and into the Atlas Mountains. Sultans of Morocco, however, never ruled the hills. Berbers resisted the armies of France

from 1912 to 1933. Loyal Moroccans from the part of the country under French control formed celebrated shock troops in World War I; the Moroccan Division had a 300 percent turn-over during that war, and was called "The Stormy Petrels" after birds that are said to bring storms. Americans fought with them at Chateau Thierry and elsewhere under General Henri Gouraud. Abd El Krim, Berber chief, wiped out a Spanish army under General Sylvestre in Tangier in 1923, and with 20,000 men harried for 8 years a French army which grew to 140,000. Berbers flown to Spain from Spanish Morocco got Franco started in the face of huge odds. Berbers can fight. Two Moroccan infantry divisions and a Moroccan mountain division added fresh proof of that in World War II, but the best African native troops of all are the Goums.

Goumiers are illiterate, which made their military instruction difficult, despite the fact that our numerals, on sights and instruments, are derived from their own. Although they are intelligent, enthusiastic, and attentive to all instruction in arms, some did not become expert with mortars and machine guns, and skilled snipers were relatively rare among them. Their illiteracy was an advantage in one sense. They had never strained their eyes in reading or by doing close work. They had not used artificial light. Like all peoples who live next to nature, they had better eyesight than more civilized men, both in

These Goum members on parade wear their traditional robe, which contrasts with the U. S. web equipment and M1917 rifles.

visual acuity and night vision. It has been suggested that their native diet, including much whole grain, may have contributed to this result.

Aggressiveness, patience, and ability to utilize terrain are among their assets on patrol duty. They creep and crawl less than we do; although their long woolen *djeballahs* cover their equipment and prevent noise, it is easier for the men inside them to move in crouching bounds. Having lived in *noualas*, stone huts built like igloos, they sit cross-legged on the ground from infancy, and their limbs are not as subject to stiffness as are ours.

Chief among their fighting talents is the extraordinary endurance of the Goumiers. They are wonderful walkers, and are also trained to use a sort of shuffling run. Like American Indians, whom Moroccans much resemble, they measure social status by physical prowess more than by wealth. Hardihood is a great source of pride. A Goumier easily accomplishes a march of 40 to 50 miles in broken, hilly country, without rest and on short rations. The topmost peaks of his mountains are snow-capped all the year, and the winter climate of his native country is very bitter indeed. Winter in the *djebels*, the hills of Tunisia, or in the Apennines was easily endured.

Fame was won by the Goums in the Tunisian Campaign for their reconnaissance work in the mountains. In the early stages, however, while British and American forces were being moved up from Algeria with limited transportation facilities, and the Germans were enlarging their beachhead rapidly, it proved necessary to use several Goums on defensive missions to hold key terrain features. They did delay the German advance somewhat, but at the cost of very heavy losses. Their light equipment was not enough in a slugging match with German tanks and artillery. As the campaign wore on, however, they were given missions more in keeping with their training and abilities. Their success in the north, in the final offensive of the campaign, was particularly notable. This coastal country was wild and rugged, similar to their own Morocco,. Here their prowess as night fighters and ruthlessness with knives made them famous.

The 4th Tabor was attached to the 3d Infantry Division of the United States Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, with the mission of protecting the right (north) flank of the division. In the drive on Palermo it marched and fought without rest over 72 miles of unbelievably difficult terrain in something less than 4 days and nights. Later assignments were to the 1st and to the 9th Infantry Divisions. From the French after-action report the following account is taken:

> On the night of 28–29 July, the 4th Tabor, then attached to the 1st Infantry Division, received orders to occupy Monte Caniglio without delay. This mountain is 3,500 feet high with precipitous slopes falling sheer from the peak to a small plateau at an altitude of 3,000 feet. The descent from the plateau to the adjacent valley is abrupt, over rocky terrain pocked with small caves.



Goum officers are usually French, as are most of the NCO's. This lieutenant, being decorated, wears the robe of the Goumier over his French uniform.

The 66th Goum was directed to make the initial attack. There was no moon and a low hanging fog covered the hills. Exact enemy locations were not known. Following a night march, the Goum reached the base of the objective at 0645 hours. The Goum commander was informed by a civilian that the mountain was occupied by the Germans in force. The advance was started at once in column of platoons.

The 1st (leading) Platoon came under small-arms fire immediately. The 2d Platoon was committed on the right of the 1st Platoon, and the Goum advanced rapidly up the mountain, across the plateau and to within a few yards of the enemy position. Heavy losses were sustained by the frontal and flanking fire of enemy automatic weapons at close range.

The 1st Sergeant was killed and the Goum commander seriously wounded. The Goum was forced to withdraw a short distance to the plateau.

The mountain had been enshrouded in fog which lifted at about this time (0815 hours). The 68th Goum, from a position on the right, immediately attacked the enemy left. The 3d Platoon of the 66th, which had not been committed, attacked the enemy right on the initiative of the platoon commander. This double envelopment was supported by the Tabor mortars. The Germans attempted to withdraw but were unable to do so.

The attack was pressed home, and the position stormed. Some of the enemy may have escaped. No prisoners were taken. Mission accomplished.

Three Tabors of Goums also figured prominently in the expulsion of the Germans from Corsica. Goumiers distinguished themselves also in Italy and in Southern France.

Like our airborne troops, Goums are handicapped in position warfare by lack of heavy weapons and organic support. The Moroccans have shown us, by their hardearned successes, the great value of light infantry detachments, hardened and trained for operations over difficult terrain and used for foot reconnaissance in mountainous areas and on wide fronts. The hardihood and prowess of the Goumier sets a standard of scouting and patrolling which it will be hard for our forces to meet.

Since the end of hostilities the Goums have been reduced in strength and are resuming their role of soldier-policemen in Morocco. Some Goums have reverted to inactive or reserve status. If France fights again in mountainous country, she will doubtless call once more upon her fierce Moroccan hillmen, the Goums.

Special Assault Units Used in Battle for Berlin

In the battle for Berlin, a large city converted by the Germans into a fortress for a last ditch stand, the Russians used massed mechanized units in street battles. However, Soviets do not recommend that tank units be sent into the city, where movement is usually restricted and channelized, barricades and obstacles easily prepared, and every building becomes a potential strongpoint and direct-fire gun emplacement, but the lessons learned during the battle of Berlin are worthy of attention.

Writing in "Red Star," an official Red Army publication, a Major N. Novskov details what was found in Berlin, the difficulties encountered, and some of the methods used to overcome the stubborn German defense.

For the battle of Berlin, the Russians organized combined assault detachments, consisting of one tank battalion, a rifle battalion, a company or platoon of engineers, a battalion of artillery (not less than 122-millimeter), and a platoon of flame throwers.

Fundamentally, the defense of Berlin was based on three defensive belts, with intermediate strongpoints: the outer ring of defense along the line of lakes and canals; the ring of defense in the outskirts and suburbs; and an inner ring in the city proper.

The Germans had expected the assault to be made from the East and had concentrated their defenses in that area. Soviet tank units, however, attacked from the south, cutting off the Berlin garrison from the southern German armies which were to have constituted its defense in that sector. The attack in the southern sector moved swiftly, with the Soviets by-passing the main centers of resistance and driving quickly through the outskirts and into the suburbs.

"Berlin shall remain German!"—that's what the sign on the wall claims, but the crew of this Red Army 122-mm self-propelled gun had something else to say about it. It was with artillery of this type that the Red Army fought into Berlin.

One big obstacle that had to be countered in this first phase was the crossing of the Teltow Canal, where the Germans had demolished all the bridges or had prepared them for demolition. After a thorough reconnaissance, a well organized and coordinated assault was made on the canal and a crossing effected.

In the suburbs, the tanks had a certain degree of maneuverability, due to the larger number of gardens, squares, parks, and athletic fields. They were able to by-pass and envelop separate centers of resistance, to attack some defense fortifications from the rear, and to complete enveloping movements in some cases. Once enveloped, the defense zones in this area quickly collapsed.

In the center of the city, the nature of the fighting was quite different from the fighting in the suburban area. Many-storied buildings in solid masses reduced the maneuverability of tank units. The only avenues of advance were along the streets from building to building. Maneuver was not entirely prohibited, however, for heavily barricaded streets and strongpoints could be enveloped by way of adjacent buildings.

During the battle for the center of the city, the tanks were used in a supporting role to reinforce the infantry and artillery. The infantry cleared the buildings of antitank gunners who were concealed in the

basements or in the lower floors. After the buildings had been cleared, the tanks would advance.

It was in this battle for the center of the city that the combined assault detachments proved their worth. The combined detachment was able to attack with well protected flanks, and could maneuver within the limits of two or three buildings.

The general plan of operations of the assault detachments was as follows: If the detachment met with obstructions, it by-passed the obstruction, or the sappers would blow up the obstacle under the cover of tank and infantry fire. At the same time, the artillery placed fire on the buildings beyond the obstruction, thus blinding the enemy defense and providing additional cover under which the flame throwers set the buildings afire. After demolition of the obstruction, the tanks then rushed forward and tried to get past the enemy defense zone, while the infantry cleared the enemy from the zone itself. Flanks were protected along the side streets by self-propelled mounts or by tanks.

This basic plan was, of course, subject to variation. Depending upon a number of elements, such as the nature of the enemy fortifications, the enemy power of resistance, and the composition of the attacking elements, the tank battalion can attack along two or three streets. Major Novskov asserts that it is better to attack along three

A group of Soviet 152-mm self-propelled gun-howitzers halt on the side of an avenue during the fight for Berlin. The Red Army broke into the German capital by using detachments of tanks, assault guns, infantry, and support troops.

Red Army T-34 tanks rendezvous in the rubble of a Berlin square. During combat in the city, Soviet tank battalions, supported by infantry, assault guns, and engineers, attacked on an average front of two to three city streets wide.

streets, keeping the reserve in the center. When the attack is successful along any of the streets, the attacking force is then able to maneuver and envelope the stronger portion of the defensive zone. A tank attack along a larger number of streets leads to a dispersal of force and a reduction in the rate of attack.

Each tank brigade ordinarily had as a main objective the envelopment of from four to six buildings. In the accomplishment of its mission it was found to be of special importance to have a mobile reserve capable of commitment in the direction of the main effort.

Major Novskov states that the boldness of the tankmen played a great role in the street battles. When artificial obstructions were not present, the tanks, with motorized infantry dismounting at high speed, dashed through cerain buildings to intersections, squares, or parks, where they took up positions and waited for the infantry. When the infantry had cleared the enemy from the buildings that had been passed by the tanks, the tanks again moved forward in the same manner. When a defended obstacle was encountered, the tanks first tried to by-pass it. When it proved to be impossible to by-pass the obstacle, and only when it was impossible, they would begin assault operations.

An example of the action of one assault group is cited by Major Novskov. "While attacking in the direction of the Ringbahn (loop railroad), the tank battalion was stopped in the northern part of Mecklenburgische Strasse by a reinforced concrete wall 8 meters wide and 2.5 meters high. The barricade was protected by strong machine gun and automatic fire and also by antitank grenade launchers installed in houses at the barricade itself. There were no detours. The commander decided to break through the obstacle. He first sent out a group of submachine gunners whose mission was to annihilate the grenade launchers, which was accomplished in a short period of time. Then 122-millimeter guns opened fire on the houses where the enemy firing points were located. The tanks, advancing simultaneously with the artillery, also opened fire on the buildings on the other side of the barricade. Under cover of the artillery and tank fire assault engineers climbed up to the barricade with explosives. After three explosions in the barricade, a breach was made through which tanks and infantry rushed. The well organized mutual support guaranteed the success of the attack."

In the case of Berlin, used as an example of a large modern city turned into a fortress, the Russians emphasize the importance of mobile reserves; the formation of cooperating teams of tanks, infantry, artillery, and engineers; the importance of heavy artillery ("not less than 122-millimeter"); and the fact that maneuver though restricted by the channelized avenues of advance, can still be performed on a limited scale.

The Soviets further note that the use of massed tanks in the streets of a modern city is not recommended, but that it has been done, and tanks can be used effectively if it is done correctly.

They emphasize the importance of not dispersing the attacking force too greatly, and of attacking on a relatively narrow front for each assault detachment.

SWEDEN TURNS TO JETS

New Planes Revamping Air Force

During World War II, no other European neutral was in such a precarious position as Sweden. Strategically located across the Baltic Sea from Germany, there was every possibility that Sweden might have become another battlefield for the Nazi and Red Armies. As a result, Sweden has learned a lesson, and is making provisions for future security in the age of modern weapons and warfare.

Not all the planning for a postwar military establishment, based upon the lessons learned in World War II, is being done by the so-called "major" powers. The military leaders of Sweden, who maintained a precarious neutrality during the recent conflict, apparently have not been oblivious to the fighting which took place practically on their doorstep. Instead, they have been quick to recognize the significance of new weapons and military techniques developed by the belligerents in the recent world conflict.

Chief of these has been the jet-propelled plane, just coming into its own at war's end. The Swedes have watched its development by other nations, have seen the introduction of the atomic bomb to warfare, and as a result they are now on the threshold of revamping their air force to conform to a Swedish estimate of the future of air power.

The role of the Swedish Air Force in the event of a war would be primarily a defensive one. The strategic defense of Sweden by the Air Force is based on a fast and highly maneuverable striking force of fighter, attack, and dive-bomber aircraft based at widely scattered military airfields. With this in mind the tactical doctrine of the Air Force has been based on the development of a swift, low-level attacking force utilizing the maximum number of available aircraft in initial blows, the heaviest aircraft employed being the Swedish medium bomber, the B–18. Some changes in existing tactics were formulated around the newly developed J–21 fighter aircraft together with the attack and dive-bomber version, the B–21. Certain additional

variations in the employment of the Air Force to include the use of the recently purchased British jet-propelled "Vampire" aircraft are causing revisions and modifications in the tactical and strategic doctrines under consideration by the Air Staff. Since these doctrines will not be completed until the operational capabilities of the "Vampire" are familiar to the Air Force Staff Section charged with the formulation of the doctrines, it is difficult at this time to foretell precisely the extent to which the Air Force may have to go in order to adapt its present organization, strategy, and tactics to include the use of jet-propelled aircraft.

It may be well to note at this point that General Jung, Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces, has withheld submission of the second 5-Year Plan for the expansion of the national defense system due to certain "changed circumstances." Grounds for alterations in the plan include the introduction of the atomic bomb, the uncertainty of the international situation, and attempts by the United Nations to prevent military conflicts. The defenses of Sweden will have to be adapted to these new developments. In this connection statements made by Lieutenant General Nordenskiold upon his return from trips to Great Britain and the United States in the fall of 1945 are quite interesting. He seemed to be of the opinion at that time that the use of the atomic bomb would have no restraining influence on the development of conventional aircraft, including those with jet propulsion units.

A secret appropriation for research and development in the field of jet propulsion was made by the Swedish Parliament late in 1944. In September of 1945 the Royal Swedish Air Force established a jet propulsion research section in the engine department of the Matériel Division. This section is charged with the responsibility of conducting critical and exhaustive investigations as to the possibilities of jet propulsion engines and is working on the problem in conjunction with civilian engine and aircraft manufacturers. Jet engine research is presently handled by two civilian manufacturers—*Svenska Turbine Aktiebolaget Ljungström* at Finspång and *Svenska Flygmotor Aktiebolaget* at Trollhättan. Both of these factories have built jet engines, the component parts of which are now undergoing tests. No official information has been released as to the current progress of jet engine development in Sweden since the project is classified as Secret. The J–21 fighter aircraft is to be used as a flying test-bed for jet propulsion investigation.

THE J–21 FIGHTER

The J–21 fighter is a single-seat, low-wing, cantilever aircraft with twin-booms and tricycle undercarriage, somewhat similar to the U. S. P–38. The main wheels retract into their respective booms and the

nose wheel into the forward part of the nacelle. The nacelle is of monocoque construction and accomodates the pilot, part of the forward armament, and the pusher engine. The square-tipped wings have dihedral and are slightly tapered. The aircraft has a wing span of 38 feet, is 34 feet in length and has a height of 15 feet. There is a high-set tailplane between the booms and the fins and rudder are approximately egg-shaped. The airplane is powered with a Daimler-Benz 605–B, inverted–V liquid-cooled, inline, 1,450 horsepower engine driving a three-blade pusher airscrew. The engine is mounted in the rear of the nacelle. The radiator, coolers and air intake are in the leading edge of the wing between the booms. A self-sealing rubber fuel tank is located immediately behind the pilot and in front of the engine. The bomb racks, installed in the wing outboard of each tail boom, may



This is the Swedish J-21 fighter. It has a wing span of 38 feet, is 34 feet long, and is powered by a 1,450-horsepower, liquid-cooled, inline engine which drives a three-blade pusher airscrew.

be used either for bombs or auxiliary fuel tanks. The 20-mm thick armor plate incorporated in the design of the airplane is located ahead of and behind the pilot. Standard armament of the J–21 consists of two 13.2-mm machine guns and one 20-mm cannon mounted in the nose and one 13.2-machine gun located in the root of each tail boom in the leading edge of the wing.

The present policy of the Royal Swedish Air Force is to develop the J–21 into a jet-propelled type thus eliminating the expense of maintaining several different types of aircraft. Conversion of the aircraft should entail no great difficulty in view of the fact that it was originally designed for high speeds. One of the most significant changes will be the displacement of the air intake to the fuselage. Although the development of the Swedish jet propulsion unit has made excellent progress, no complete engine has been constructed to date. For this

The J-21 fighter is to be used as a flying test-bed for jet propulsion investigation. When in flight, the main wheels retract into their respective booms and the nose wheel into the forward part of the nacelle.

reason the Air Force determined to purchase a number of DeHavilland "Goblin" turbo-jet engines from Great Britain in order to test the flight possibilities of the proposed jet-propelled version of the J–21. This version has been designated as the J–21R and will resemble the British "Vampire" to some extent.

THE "VAMPIRE"

The British DeHavilland DH 100 "Vampire" is a single seat, midwing, twin-boom aircraft of mixed metal and wood construction, propelled by a single DeHavilland "Goblin" turbo-jet unit. Most

Standard armament of the J-21 consists of two 13.2-mm machine guns and one 20-mm cannon mounted in the nose of the aircraft, and one 13.2-mm machine gun at the root of each tail boom in the leading edge of the wing.

characteristic feature of this jet-propelled fighter is the cross boom raised high on the vertical fins to avoid the hot discharge from the jet cone ejection outlet at the rear of the fuselage nacelle. Wing roots are thickened at the leading edge to provide for air intakes which combine in the turbine chamber. Wing span is 40 feet, length is 30½ feet, height is 9¾ feet and wing area is 258 square feet. First flight of the prototype was in September 1943 and by the spring of 1944 the maximum speed was above 500 miles per hour. While continuous level speed is listed at over 540 miles per hour it is not believed capable of matching the 600 plus miles per hour speed of the U. S. Lockheed P–80 "Shooting Star." The still-air range of the Mark I series is 500 miles at sea level at 400 miles per hour, or 1,050 miles at 30,000 feet at 450 miles per hour. The latest Mark II type is reported to have a range of 1,400 miles. A maximum ceiling of 50,000 feet and service ceiling of 45,000 feet necessitates complete cockpit pressurization. Although it was originally designed as a land-based interceptor, the Royal Navy has been testing it for carrier use, the first successful operation of this nature being reported in December 1945. There are no reports of the "Vampire" engaging in combat although it was thought to have been kept in readiness for the German long-range jet fighter and was equipped with four 20-mm cannon.

The Royal Swedish Air Force has concluded negotiations with the DeHavilland Aircraft Company Ltd. of Great Britain for the purchase of approximately 75 DeHavilland DH 100 "Vampire" jet-propelled fighter aircraft. Deliveries of the aircraft are scheduled to start the end of April of this year. According to an announcement by the Chief of the Air Force, the *Braavalla* Air Wing stationed at Norrkoping will be the first air wing to be completely equipped with the jet-propelled machines. The Swedish J–22 fighter aircraft now in use by the Wing are to be placed on a reserve status and will be replaced by the "Vampires." A series of check flights in the J–21 fighter, employing the same flying techniques used in flying the "Vampire," will be a prerequisite to operation of the jet-propelled machine. Indications are that personnel from the *Braavalla* Air Wing will probably be sent to England for additional special training in flying the jet aircraft.

In addition to the contract for the purchase of the "Vampire" aircraft, two other contracts were signed in February of this year. One of these provided for the purchase of an unknown number of DeHavilland "Goblin" turbo-jet engines to be used in the "Vampire" and in the flight testing of the J–21R. The third contract provided for the production rights of the engines under license to the Swedish aero-engine manufacturers Svenska Flygmotor Aktiebolaget of Trollhät-



The British DH100 "Vampire," propelled by a single turbo-jet unit, has been purchased by the Royal Swedish Air Force. Wing span is 40 feet, length 30½ feet. Continuous level speed is listed at over 540 miles per hour, with a service ceiling of 45,000 feet in altitude.

tan. This production license was sought by Sweden in order to be independent of foreign supply, should the development of a Swedish jet-propulsion unit require more time than was originally foreseen. Sweden has sent several aeronautical engineers to the Hatfield and London factories of the DeHavilland Company to study the engine more thoroughly.

SWEDISH AIR FORCE

The Royal Swedish Air Force, a separate branch of the Armed Forces, has been operating until the present time as a militia force consisting of reserve personnel (officers, noncommissioned officers, and flying crews) trained during their regular period of military service and subsequently called up anually for refresher courses. However,

the rapid progress made by aviation industry all over the world in the development of more complex types of aircraft during the past several years has brought to the fore in Sweden a realization of the necessity for a good supply of highly qualified pilots.

The Air Staff has been working on plans for the creation of a standing air force composed of permanent personnel. These plans are expected to be an integral part of the new Swedish defense plans which will be crystallized and ratified by the Defense Committee and the Parliament within the next few months. According to statements by Lt. Gen. Bengt Nordenskiold, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, in support of the proposal for a change-over to a standing force, experience has shown that the pilot training given to reserve and conscript personnel during the first term of service cannot be maintained adequately with the system of refresher maneuvers now in effect. As it is not considered possible to increase these maneuvers to a sufficient extent, Nordenskiold maintains that it is necessary to abolish completely the militia or reserve air force and introduce a category of regular air force pilots. The establishment of regular air force pilots as proposed by Nordenskiold calls for the recruiting of trainees 18 years of age for a 6-year service period with the Air Force. During this period the recruits will be trained without promotion to the rank of officer. Upon the conclusion of the 6 years they will either continue as officers on active service or leave the Air Force entirely. By this method of constantly keeping a certain number of pilots under training it is expected that the high degree of technical skill required in the operation of the latest types of aircraft, with particular reference to the jet-propelled machines, will be reached.

Although the over-all efficiency of the Royal Swedish Air Force is high, the combat efficiency is difficult to determine inasmuch as the Air Force has never been combat tested. At present the active Air Force officers are highly proficient in all branches of the Air Force and demonstrate superior skill in handling aircraft. The reserve and enlisted pilots rank somewhat below the active pilots in proficiency. In order to increase the combat efficiency of the Air Force as a whole, the Air Staff has recently adopted the policy of maintaining all flying personnel on an equal basis.

THE RED ARMY INFANTRYMAN



The largest ground army of the present day is the Red Army. We may better understand it and its capabilities if we know something about the individual soldier in that army; his origin and civilian training, what he gives and what he gets during his military service, and how and what he is taught in the army.

The Red Army soldier is first of all a Russian. He is the product of the special way of life that exists in the U. S. S. R. as the result of heritage from the past and of present conditions. Some 180 nationalities are included in the U. S. S. R. The *Krasnoarmeets* (the Red Army soldier) may be any of these nationalities, for every male

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citizen of the U. S. S. R. is equally liable for military service. Under the Universal Military Service law of 1939, all male citizens "regardless of race, nationality, religious belief, educational qualifications, social origin, and position" are subject to military service.

The Soviet Constitution, as well as the Universal Military Service Law, emphasizes the liability of every citizen for military service, for Article 133 states that "the defense of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the U. S. S. R."

But from whatever nationality among the Russians he may come, the Red Army recruit goes into the actual military establishment already prepared to carry out his duties as a soldier. He has been a part in a gigantic training program since the first grade of school.

The average Red Army soldier has completed 10 years of schooling if he is from one of the major cities. If he is from a rural district, he will probably have had at least 7 years of schooling. All during these school years, he has been indoctrinated with the thought that military service is an honor and a patriotic obligation. He has been given military drill, and has had his body built up through exercise all through the first 7 years of school. From the eight through the tenth grades, he has been given preconscription training that is similar to our C. M. T. C. program, but more intensive. The program includes some small-arm range training, 2 weeks of summer military camps, and some company tactics. In short, the Red Army soldier gets a large share of what we call "basic training" before he enters the army.

The recruit is called for his period of military service at the age of 19, or at 18 if he has finished middle school (comparable to our high school) at that age. Certain deferments are granted to those not physically fit and to scientists, rural school teachers, and certain essential workers.

In the army, he serves a period of 2 years. Following the period of active service he goes on an "extended furlough." During that time he may go home and hold a job, but is subject to immediate recall in case of emergency, and is subject to brief training periods. The period of extended furlough lasts from the end of the period of active service, until such time as a total of 5 years of military service is completed.

During his period of active service, the soldier undergoes an intensive program of training. He receives training in weapons and tactics, plus a large amount of subjective training and political indoctrination.

The noncommissioned officer in the Red Army is a product of schools that are similar in purpose and operation to our own regimental NCO schools. Noncommissioned officers must serve a period of 3 years, rather than 2 as do the privates. Most students of the noncommissioned schools are selected from among volunteers, though some may be detailed to the school. Before World War II, the NCO school lasted for 9 months. During the war, the time was reduced to 3

The average Red Army recruit enters military service with a good background of preinduction training. He is also well indoctrinated politically, but as a person he is not unlike many an American G. I.

months. The working day was increased however from 8 hours to 10 to 12 hours.

Officers may come from the ranks or from civil life. In either case, the officer is the product of a series of officer schools. Entrance to the schools is based on educational qualifications or upon the passing of an entrance examination. If successful, the candidate will graduate as a junior lieutenant after 2 years. During the war, the period was reduced to 6 months. Further military education is highly selective and competitive and the officer must show his worth before he is admitted to the higher service schools.

Discipline is strict in the Red Army, though under combat conditions there was not too great a difference made between company-grade officers and enlisted men. A deliberate effort is being made to foster an officer corps, and officers are now receiving many privileges that were not accorded to their predecessors before the beginning of World War II.

The Red Army infantryman travels light. He has a minimum of personal equipment. Tents are seldom used and shelter is improvised

The Red Army infantryman travels light. He has a minimum of personal equipment. His uniform is simple and comfortable, consisting primarily of a pull-over jacket, baggy trousers, and high-top boots.

from local materials. He has been taught the elimination of nonessentials, and improvisation to meet his needs.

Normally the infantryman is armed with a rifle, carbine, or submachine gun. The water-cooled Maxim is the standard heavy machine gun, while the M1927 Degtyarev is the standard light machine gun used by the infantry squad. Some automatic rifles are carried. All small arms are caliber 7.62 millimeter. While many mortars are used in the Red Army, it is not normally considered an infantry weapon and the mortar crew does not come from the infantry. The Red Army infantrymen's weapons are good, and he has proven that he can use them effectively and well.

Though many an American G. I. will grunt derisively when told that other people walk more than he does, it is true that the Soviet infantryman must depend upon his feet for much of his transportation. There are not as many vehicles assigned to infantry units in the Red Army as in the U. S., and the majority of those assigned must be used for supply, and as prime movers for artillery and antiaircraft guns, and to haul ammunition.

The Red Army soldier has, like his American counterpart, been granted many benefits as a veteran. During his active service career, however, his pay appears to be a pittance by U. S. standards. The

Red Army private receives a total of 600 rubles per year, which is very difficult to access in U. S. dollars, since purchasing power of the ruble to the average Soviet citizen is almost nil. Pay scales range from that of the private to that of a General of the Army, which is 60,000 rubles per year. The equivalent of a private first class receives 1,000 rubles per year; a corporal, 2,000 rubles; a sergeant, 3,000 rubles; a first sergeant, 4,200 rubles. The discrepancy between officer and enlisted pay is great. The first lieutenant receives 12.5 times the pay of a private, or 7,700 rubles per year.

The base pay of Red Army personnel is computed according to the position held, as well as the rank. For instance, a captain's base pay may vary from 8,700 rubles to 9,600 rubles depending upon whether

Not all the Soviet G. I.'s are men. Women, such as the soldier shown here (above, right) have a place among Red Army ground troops. Although most women soldiers are in service and medical units, some have played a combat role.

he is an infantry company commander or a mortar company commander. Extra pay is given for long service.

Certain units receive higher pay than others. Guards units, which have distinguished themselves in action, receive double pay in the ranks. There are additional kinds of extra pay for front-line service, up to 100 percent increase over base pay. For instance, in 1942, antitank gunners received an increase of 100 percent in their base pay (officers 75 percent) and also got bonuses for each enemy tank destroyed.

Certain extra pay benefits are given those who hold decorations. Decorations also carry with them other benefits, such as free transportation on public conveyances and one round trip ticket per year on the railroads.

As a part of his pay, the soldier receives, in addition, a ration of cigarettes and vodka, movie and theater tickets, and free toilet articles.

The uniform of the Red Army soldier is simple and comfortable. The overhanging shirt, secured at the waist by a wide belt, and the overseas cap with the Red Star emblem are familiar objects to the reader of the daily paper. However, during the war a wide mixture of military and civilian clothing was necessary.

Officers and men wear similar uniforms in the field, but an effort is being made to provide a distinctive officer uniform for garrison and off-duty use.

Both officer and enlisted men wear shoulder boards which carry the rank insignia and the color of the branch of service or grade. Olive drab boards are supposed to be worn in the field, but quite often the brighter, dress boards were used. In combat, the Red Army men preferred the overseas cap to the helmet, and the overseas cap was more often worn.

Various special units have their own distinctive insignia and dress. The winter uniform includes the well-known parka and white overpants. Fur hats, padded jackets and overcoats are common articles of winter issue.

Guards badges, signifying crack organizations, and wound stripes are worn on the right-hand side of the blouse. Other decorations are worn on the left. The Red Army man wears the medal, rather than the ribbon as do the U. S. troops.

The rations of the Red Army are not elaborate, but are nourishing and heavy. Standard are rich soups and stews of vegetables and meat, garnished with sour cream if possible. One common dish is "kasha," a sort of porridge of buckwheat. In time of war, living off the country is an established practice of the Red Army.

During his entire army career, and before and after, the Red Army man is subjected to instruction in the doctrines and political philosophy of the Communist Party. Many hours of the preconscription training are devoted to political subjects, and during his army career

the soldier hears lectures, sees films, and reads literature prepared to educate him in the accepted Soviet political thought. In addition, he receives much instruction in the history and traditions of the Red Army. He is also taught to hate the enemy through lectures and films on enemy atrocities. He hears much of heroic acts of the Red Army and of individual Red Army soldiers.

Women play a definite part in the Red Army. Many service troops are women, and much of the cooking of infantry units is done by women. As distinguished from purely the service troops, many women have been used as snipers and in guerrilla fighting. There have been some instances of women being used as combat unit commanders. Red Army nursing personnel quite often operate much closer to the actual fighting than is customary in other armies, and there have been many instances of the nurses accompanying units in combat, much as our battalion aid men do.

This end product of a continuous training cycle, the Red Army soldier, is a hard, determined, courageous individual who is eager to defend Russia. This obligation has been pointed up by the oath that he now takes individually, and not collectively as was the past practice. Usually on Red Army Day, the 1st of May, the *Krasnoarmeets* rededicates himself by repeating his enlistment oath.

Chow in the Red Army is not elaborate, but is nourishing and heavy. Standard are rich soups and stews of vegetables and meat. One common dish is "kasha," a sort of buckwheat porridge.

There are a great number of men prepared to carry out the provisions of that oath. The present strength of the Red Army is near the 6,000,000 mark, and behind the men on active service are large numbers of reservists, many of whom are combat veterans of World War II.

"The officer is a leader and a teacher. Besides his knowledge of men and his sense of justice he must be distinguished by his superior knowledge and experience, his earnestness, his self-control and high courage.

"The example and personal conduct of officers and noncommissioned officers are of decisive influence on the troops. The officer who in the face of the enemy is cold-blooded, decisive, and courageous inspires his troops onward. The officer must likewise find the way to the hearts of his subordinates and gain their trust through an understanding of their feelings and thoughts and through never ceasing care of their needs."—From *Truppenfuhrung* (Troop leading), German Field Service Regulations.

Alamo Scouts

Careful Reconnaissance Training Paid Off For Sixth Army Unit

On the 22d of October 1944, 2 days after the invasion of Leyte by seaborne troops of the U. S. Sixth Army, a small rubber boat carrying five or six men grounded on a beach near the village of Ipal on the north coast of the island of Mindanao in the Philippine Archipelago. The men were not castaways who had drifted ashore on an enemy-held island. Rather, they were a group of specially-trained scouts under the command of Lieutenant William E. Nellist.

Since the Ipal portion of Mindanao—the Surigao Peninsula—overlooks Leyte from the south, it was to the best interests of the Sixth Army Commander, General Walter Krueger, to obtain all possible information regarding enemy forces and installations on that part of Mindanao. This was the task of the "Nellist Mission." During the 4 days that followed the landing, Lieutenant Nellist and his men accomplished the following: They made a thorough study of nearby beach areas to determine their suitability for possible subsequent landings; they surveyed and reported on the inland areas behind the beaches; they determined the size and probable capabilities of enemy forces in the area; they gathered information pertaining to the food and water supplies of the area, and to installations then erected by the enemy; they located ammunition dumps; they located small minefields in the water areas adjacent to the area; and they prepared accurate maps to pinpoint the intelligence obtained. After 4 days of thorough reconnaissance, the team of scouts was evacuated according to plan, and returned to army headquarters with the intelligence they had gathered.

In short, the Nellist Mission was an exemplary piece of combat intelligence work.

The Alamo Scouts worked in teams of five or six men. Their mission was reconnaissance, reconnaissance by stealth. They were trained to use their weapons, but only in self defense. Their primary job was finding out what went on behind enemy lines, without the Japs discovering the presence of the team in the area.

But who is Nellist, and who are the men he worked with? How was his patrol able to operate so efficiently and on a mission so far removed from the other tactical activities of the Sixth Army? The answers to these questions is the story of one of the most active, but little known, combat intelligence units to operate in the Pacific during World War II. It is also a lesson in how men may be selected and trained for one of the primary requisites of combat intelligence—good reconnaissance.

Lieutenant Nellist and his men were a team of what was known in the Southwest Pacific as "Alamo Scouts," the word "Alamo" being the code name for the Sixth Army. The idea of a special reconnaissance unit to operate for, and under the command of, the army commander can be attributed to General Krueger himself. At that time, December of 1943, Sixth Army headquarters was located on little Goodenough Island, just north of the eastern tip of New Guinea. In the same month, the Alamo Scout Training Center was established on nearby Fergusson Island under the direction of the Sixth Army G–2. The officers who were concerned with the selection and training of personnel for the Alamo Scout unit started with the theory that any male who wears the army uniform can be designated as a "scout," but that there are comparably few who can be capable and dependable in that capacity. Reconnaissance, as it was envisioned for the Alamo Scout unit, was a specialized military service requiring particular tem-

perament and talent. It was believed, however, that men possessed of the proper qualities were not so rare as to discourage the project. Consequently a call for volunteers, both commissioned and enlisted, was made throughout the troops of the Sixth Army.

In selecting men for training from among the volunteers who responded, the Sixth Army G–2 was guided by this thought:

> Foremost of the requisites of a good scout is that he be intelligent. This does not mean "well educated." He need not hold a degree, he need not even have completed high school, though experience has proved that the better scouts are men who have at least completed high school. He must have "horse sense"—be able to think logically and make sound deductions.
>
> Physically, a scout need not be a big man nor have the frame of an athlete. He must be strong enough to withstand fatigue on arduous marches and he must have no physical defects or debilitating diseases. His vision must be clear without the use of glasses and he must be a capable swimmer. This does not mean that he be merely able to swim. It means that he must be able to swim in rough surf or over distances up to at least a half mile. His physical vigor and resistance must be such that he is able to travel for weeks without the need of medical attention, since normally it will be impossible for him to get such attention.
>
> Hand-in-hand with his intelligence and physical fitness, a scout needs courage and an attribute which may be called daring or a spirit of adventure—and this is to be distinguished from recklessness and lack of reasonable judgment.
>
> Scouts are often called upon to make marches over tortuous terrain, up to 30 or 40 miles with little rest and little food. Trails and easy going are normally forbidden him since he must not be seen. A man without grit cannot do it. It takes courage, too, to get into a rubber boat with five or six other men, paddle silently through darkness and land on an enemy shore where there are no friendly troops. Scout teams never know whether they have gone undetected or whether they are paddling into the hands of an alert enemy. They do know that, if they are caught, there is virtually no hope for assistance. They must dare the risk.
>
> Being naturally observant is part of a scout's equipment, and in this respect, men from small communities and rural areas seem most gifted. City-bred men are not excluded, however. Some of them have made excellent scouts. In basic training, all soldiers get instruction in scouting and patrolling, the use of the compass, and the use of cover and concealment. If they have not shown a natural aptitude for these subjects, it is not likely that they would make good scouts and time does not permit "starting from scratch."
>
> Proper temperament or personality is the last requisite, but certainly not the least important. Teamwork is the key to successful scouting and not every man is willing or temperamentally suited to mold himself into part of a small unit. Certainly initiative and individuality are desirable, since no one wants to work with a "deadhead," but a scout must harmonize his individualism with that of other members of his team. Being bellicose, loud, "mouthy"—being self-centered, contemptuous of others' opinions, unamenable to compromise, he will not succeed in this field.

Thus the Sixth Army G–2, when he issued a call for volunteers from troops then in the Southwest Pacific, had a pretty good idea as to the



It was not unusual for an Alamo Scout team to precede an invasion force by several days into an enemy held area. In the Southwest Pacific, this meant night landings in rubber boats on hostile shores—an operation demanding plenty of courage.

type of men who were wanted for this new unit. He also knew how they would be trained, and—later—employed to the utmost advantage.

In response to the call for volunteers, applications were received from every type of unit and organization. There were infantrymen, cavalrymen, engineers, paratroopers—line privates, platoon sergeants, radio men, clerks, and drivers. From these a selection was made.

Of the officers who volunteered, preference was given to the junior grades. This was not only because they were younger, but because their job, command of a six-man team, did not seem to call for officers of a higher rank. The selection of officers was made with particular care. The officer scout leader, because of the method in which the scouts were to work, had to be able to hold the respect and confidence of his men, and yet live and work with them in the closest of relationships. The officer held the role of the elder brother. He had to be the guide, the stabilizing influence, but he could not use the arbitrary last word of command, since each scout team planned and worked together. In fact, when a team was in the field, it would have been difficult for the casual observer to pick the officer leader from among his men.

Of the first group of applicants, some 5 officers and 26 enlisted men were selected and sent to the Alamo Scout Training Center on Fergusson Island.

Since most of the subjects incorporated in the training program

were not new to the potential scouts, 6 weeks proved to be sufficient time in which to train each man. The first 3½ weeks of training was spent mostly in the classroom studying such subjects as map and aerial photograph reading, sketching, radio techniques, and message writing. Field work included, besides all the finer points of scouting and patrolling, the use of the compass, the handling of rubber boats, night landings with these craft, and beach reconnaissance. Marksmanship with all small arms was a requisite, and candidates for the Alamo Scout unit were put through a conditioning program of vigorous physical training. This included exercise, hikes, and swimming—the latter giving emphasis to underwater work.

Instructors at the training center discovered that although all soldiers are instructed in the rudiments of scouting and patrolling as part of their army training, surprisingly few of the volunteers were well-versed in the techniques of reconnaissance when they entered the Alamo Scout school. At intervals during the training period, the officer students were called into consultation and asked to rate the men who were assigned to them. Six-man teams were the standard working unit of student scouts, and the personnel of these teams were rotated and changed-about weekly. When it became apparent that a student was not qualifying, he was relieved from duty at the school and was returned to his original organization. Throughout the

Alamo Scouts learned to travel with a minimum of equipment. The standard wardrobe included little more than fatigue hat, face paint, camouflage suit, an individual weapon with a minimum of ammunition and some web equipment.



During their existence as a unit, the Alamo Scouts performed over 60 combat intelligence missions. The information they delivered to the Sixth Army G–2 was invaluable, often resulting in the saving of American lives, and the destruction of Japanese troops and installations.

whole of the instruction, every attempt was made to instill an *esprit de corps* among the students, and to give them a desire to qualify as a full-fledged Alamo Scout.

The last 2 weeks of the training period was devoted to field work and problems approximating as closely as possible the actual types of missions the scouts would be called upon to perform "when the chips were down."

When the 6 weeks of training were over, the enlisted men students were given ballots on which they wrote, in order of preference, the names of three officer students they would be most willing to follow on a mission. By the same means, each officer student named the six men he would most like to have on his scout team. The scout instructors added their own observations, and from this aggregate of opinion the top men and officers were retained as scouts, the others returned to their units.

From the first class through the training center, four scout teams were organized. On the whole, eight such classes were held from time to time, and from them came a total of 10 capable scout teams. These were the Alamo Scouts.

The first combat mission of the Alamo Scouts was performed on

26 February 1943, in the Admiralty Islands. From then on the unit was a going concern. Night landings and secret reconnaissance missions then preceded nearly every one of the many seaborne invasions staged by the troops of the Sixth Army. Although the scouts functioned primarily for the Sixth Army commander, teams were often "loaned" to task force commanders for specific operations.

As the Sixth Army moved west along the New Guinea coast, and thence north to the Philippines, many lessons were learned through actual operational experience. Some of the first scouts to be sent out carried too much food. Scouting far from friendly troops, and often deep in enemy-occupied territory, kept nerves in such a state of tension that much food was neither desired nor necessary. At first it was a standard practice to deflate and hide the rubber boat, but the whistling noise made by the escaping air—a noise that might have betrayed the presence of the patrol at night to nearby enemy troops—seemed to make it more advisable to have a contact crew return the boat to a waiting PT craft. It was learned through experience that scouts should carry only the bare necessities of their trade, and that it was necessary to plan each mission down to the finest detail.

When the Sixth Army was operating in the New Guinea area, Alamo Scout missions were confined primarily to reconnaissance. But after the initial landings in the Philippines, the scouts took over another, and, in some ways, larger assignment. It was realized that the many guerrilla units scattered throughout the islands offered a fine potential source of intelligence in addition to their role of harassing the enemy. For this reason, Alamo Scout teams on many occasions were sent to

distant areas, nominally enemy controlled, and there coordinated the activities of rival guerrilla bands, established efficient guerrilla intelligence collecting systems, and relayed this intelligence by radio back to the Sixth Army G–2.

On the whole, the Alamo Scout unit performed more than 60 separate combat intelligence missions similar to that of Lieutenant Nellist and his team. In so doing, they proved that the idea of an army reconnaissance unit was not only sound, but often extremely valuable. And despite what was without doubt a hazardous business, the careful selection of personnel, the conscientious training—and, they will admit, luck—the unit was able to finish the war without a single scout killed on any of the missions they performed.

During their existence as a unit, the information provided by the scouts to their commanding general saved lives, altered plans of attack, and led to the destruction of enemy installations, troops, and shipping. They participated, successfully, in two prisoner rescue raids, and over a period of time brought in some 60 Japanese prisoners for questioning—not a mean feat in itself.

In short, the Alamo Scouts, before they were disbanded at the end of the war, earned the tribute of their Army Commander, General Krueger: "This little outfit has never failed the Sixth Army."

The Nazi 'Kamikazes'



German Leaders Failed to Recognize a New Counteramphibious Tactic

One of the most hushed up secrets of the war, back before the surrender of Japan, was the damage and inconvenience caused by the suicide-bent *Kamikaze* pilots of the Japanese Air Force. Troops who sailed to the invasion of Okinawa remember the *Baka* bomb, the winged aerial torpedo with its human pilot. But not until the end of the war, when intelligence officers began nosing around in the former Nazi domain, was it disclosed that a small group of fanatical Nazis had also organized a suicide corps for the purpose of breaking up the seaborne invasion of the continent with a German version of the Japanese *Baka.*

In fact, there is much evidence to indicate that the Nazi suicidists were laying their plans long before their Japanese allies conceived the idea for this unconventional tactic. Only bureaucratic inefficiency, and disinterest in official circles as high as Hitler himself, forstalled the appearance of Nazi *Kamikazes* in the air over Normandy on D-day.

The inception of this strange project goes back to the year 1943, when the fortunes of war were beginning to turn against the hitherto victorious German Army. At that time, many people in Germany were beginning to see that the Fatherland would ultimately go down to defeat, unless some miraculous event produced a severe set-back to the Allied cause. Among these thinking Germans was a small group of idealists who were determined to do something about it. These people, who at first numbered no more than 30 or 40 persons, came together from all walks of life. Some of them were from the Army, others were civilians, and one of the leaders was a well-known German woman flyer.

It was the common belief of these people that the war was lost unless a most decisive blow could be struck against the Allies. They believed that this could only be accomplished by the complete disruption of the eventual Allied assault upon the continent, thus convincing the Allied leaders that Germany was secure and impregnable within her "fortress Europe."

AN IDEA IS BORN

From this line of reasoning, the idea of a suicide corps was born. It was thought that a weapon could be devised in the form of a flying bomb which, when piloted to its target, could sink a large warship or troop transport. Enough of these, the idealists believed, could completely wreck any seaborne invasion with an expenditure of less than 1,000 volunteer pilots. The members of this strange group were ready to volunteer. They asked only that they be given a weapon which would be certain to achieve its end, and they felt there were persons among their membership who had the skill to design such a weapon.

By October 1943, under the leadership of the woman flyer, a doctor of the Institute of Medical Aeronautics at Rechlin, and a first lieutenant of the *Luftwaffe*, organizational plans had advanced to a point where it was necessary to obtain official recognition and cooperation in conducting the project further. Because of her unique position in German aviation circles, this duty fell to the aviatrix.

The woman first presented the idea to the *Luftwaffe* High Command, and met with immediate rebuff. The German Air Force was not interested in an idea they considered to be the unstable reasoning of a group of psychopaths. After much delay, the *Luftwaffe* was by-passed, and the aviatrix went directly to Field Marshall Milch, at that time the head of the German Air Ministry. Again no progress was made.

After more weeks had passed, the woman determined to exploit her position and reputation in German aviation circles, and succeeded in gaining a hearing before the German Academy of Aeronautics. This Academy had the power to assemble the necessary scientists, technicians, and air tactical authorities, and eventually a meeting was called by the Director of the German Aeronautical Research Council. After a lengthy conference, the committee of authorities decided that the idea was indeed operationally sound.

With this authoritative evidence in hand, the next step before the group of idealists was to obtain official support and leadership for the suicide plan. Application was made for an interview with Hitler, and in February 1944, the woman leader of the project was summoned to Berchtesgaden for a 3-hour discussion with the *Fuehrer*.

Hitler did not approve. He objected to the philosophy of suicide entailed in the plan, and pointed out that there was no precedent in German history like it. Therefore, he said, the whole idea was not in keeping with the character of the German people. The woman countered this with the argument that never before in German history had the fate of the country been in such a precarious position. This, apparently, was the wrong thing to say, for Hitler replied emphatically that the position was *not* precarious, and that if it ever became so, then he, Hitler, would personally give the orders for such desperate measures to be taken.

The interview was anything but successful, but before she left, the aviatrix did obtain Hitler's permission to continue with the development and planning so that the organization would be ready to operate if ever the *Fuehrer* felt the time had come to take such desperate steps. His parting remark was to the effect that he did not want to be bothered with the idea again until the time for action was ripe.

Meanwhile the group of suicide volunteers had grown to about 70 or 80 members. As yet no concerted recruiting effort had been made, and such volunteers as were accepted were a very select group. Once accepted, a candidate for membership in the suicide corps was required to take a pledge to the effect that "I hereby volunteer as a pilot of the manned glider-bomb. I am convinced that this action will end with my death."

On the basis of Hitler's permission to continue with the development of the program, the matter was laid before the Chief of the General Staff of the German Air Force. He half-heartedly assigned the official direction of the project to the commander of a *Luftwaffe* bomber wing that was engaged in all sorts of special operations and clandestine activities. At first it appeared that the plan was finally on the road to fruition, but it soon became evident that the new commander accepted the assignment mostly because he saw in it the means of receiving the glory and credit which would be brought by the self-sacrifice of the volunteers under him.

THE WEAPON

But at the same time, the German Air Ministry was ordered to perfect the technical preparations which would be necessary to put the plan into effect. The *Messerschmitt 328*, originally designed as a fighter or fighter bomber, was selected as the flying weapon to be used by the volunteers. Production of the plane was ordered, but proceeded so slowly that the volunteers began to suspect that some sort of official sabotage was afoot. As a result, the suicide group began to look around for another weapon—one which was easy to produce and would be available on short order. The V–1 "buzz bomb,"



This is the Nazi version of the Japanese "Baka" bomb. It is driven by a typical V–1 jet engine. Carrying a load of explosive in the nose of this craft. Nazi suicide pilots planned to wreak destruction among our D-day fleet with this weapon. Although the weapon was developed, the plan went astray through official indifference and bungling among the higher echelons of the Nazi command.

rebuilt to carry a pilot, was decided upon. In less than 3 weeks, four types of this piloted missile were ready for testing.

Contrary to the wishes of the volunteer group, the *Luftwaffe* testing division insisted upon using their own pilots for the test flights. The two *Luftwaffe* men were soon seriously injured, and it was then that the woman pilot was called in and permitted to do the test flying. It was not an easy proposition. In order to train the suicide pilots, a two-seater "buzz bomb" had been built. Of course, it was necessary to land this model, if trainees were to be kept alive for the D-day mission. But since it was necessary to glide to a landing without power, and since the missile was not of conventional aircraft or glider design, the approach to the runway was necessarily steep, and landing had to be made at speeds approaching 155 miles per hour.

But as the technical development of the weapon went on with fair success, the rest of the program began to go astray through the bungling of the *Luftwaffe* officers put in charge of the volunteers. Although the suicide group at first believed the *Luftwaffe* wing commander—the one who had been appointed their official leader—was fully behind their plan, it soon became evident that he had little sincere interest in the project. What was worse, he appointed a staff of other *Luftwaffe* officers to responsible planning and operational positions. These officers apparently had no conception of the original mission of the

volunteers—to destroy the eventual Allied invasion fleet. Instead, they were continually fostering half-baked ideas, such as suicide attacks upon Soviet ammunition trains on the Eastern Front. Although the volunteers were willing to give their lives to deliver a smashing blow to the Allies, they were reluctant to die on some comparatively non-essential mission. Meawhile the training program had also bogged down. Much time was spent in physical education and pistol shooting, but little attention was paid to establishing a sound flight training program. The *Luftwaffe* Lieutenant, one of the original volunteers and who had been the spark plug behind the whole idea, found himself helpless because of his low rank. Although he tried repeatedly to make improvements, he could do nothing but take orders.

Again the woman flyer was called upon to use her influence to try and revive the rapidly failing program. This time she went to Himmler, in hopes that he might be able to do some good for the cause of the suicide volunteers. Himmler was not much help. He was not opposed to the suicide idea, but he was of the opinion that the membership of the corps should be made up of criminals and the incurably diseased. He offered to take over the program if one of his officers was permitted to assume the leadership of the entire plan. It was evident that under Himmler the plan would not receive any better treatment than it was getting under its present supervision, so his offer was turned down.

D-DAY ARRIVES

About this time, the Allies took a hand in things by staging their invasion in Normandy. Neither the suicide weapon, nor adequately trained suicide pilots were available, greatly because of the mishandling the whole program had received from its selfish or uninterested directors. The disappointment of the volunteer group was profound. Within 6 or 7 days after D-day, they realized that the invasion was a success, and that the moment for which they had been preparing had passed.

But, several days after the invasion had started, and all other efforts to halt it had failed, Herman Goering suddenly remembered that somewhere in his *Luftwaffe* there was a group of pilots who had volunteered for a suicide mission. In due course, Goering reached the commander of the bomber wing under whom the volunteers had originally been placed. The commander, a colonel, immediately declared that the group was ready for action. The volunteers were astounded. They knew that no planes or "buzz bombs" were available, and that only a few of the men had any more than the briefest of preflight training. Nonetheless, the commander and his technical assistants, without consulting the volunteers, set to work on plans to use a *Focke*

Wulf 190, carrying a 4,000-pound bomb, to crash into selected targets. Now no one in the German Air Force had ever flown this plane with such a large bomb load, and it was highly doubtful that the plane would be able to get off the ground without crashing. Consequently, regular test pilots declined the honor of testing this experimental makeshift. Undaunted, the commander announced that his suicide pilots—none of whom had ever flown an *FW 190*, if any other plane—would within the next few days conduct the test flights themselves. If they were killed, he said, their names and loyal sacrifice would be recorded in German history with the same honor they would have received if they had crashed their plane onto the deck of an enemy ship. Any enthusiasm that had remained among the volunteers disappeared completely at this point.

Fortunately for these men, Hitler heard about the plans for using the *FW 190*, and ordered the project abandoned. The bomber commander was removed, eventually, and his successor set about trying to salvage some of the finer ideas of the original project. But by then it was too late. The Allies were established in force on the continent, the hour to strike had passed, and so the group of suicide volunteers was disbanded.

"And so," to quote the woman flyer, "did an idea that was born of fervent and holy idealism, only to be misused and mismanaged at every turn by people who never understood how men could offer their lives simply for an idea in which they believed."

CONCLUSION

Were it not for the grievous damage done to our fleet units a year later by the Japanese *Kamikaze* corps, this German project might be passed off as just another unconventional tactical venture which the German leaders were smart enough to recognize as nothing but foolishness. But in the light of our later experience with the Japanese, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Nazi command failed to realize they were being offered an impressive counterweapon to seaborne invasion. It is useless, in retrospect, to attempt a reconstruction of what might have happened off Normany on D-day, if the Nazi command had recognized the potentialities of these volunteers and their piloted bomb. Although it is unlikely that the suicidists could have thus defeated the invasion, the introduction of such an unconventional tactic, if exploited on the scale later used by the Japanese, would certainly have offered another serious threat to an already difficult amphibious operation.

Soviet Hand Grenades

With the possible exception of the trench knife, no weapon is as personal to the individual soldier as is his hand grenade. In World War II, the grenade nearly replaced the rifle as the ground soldier's basic weapon. For exponents of the hand-thrown explosive, here is a round-up of Soviet grenades and how they work.

The hand grenade is not a new weapon. During World War I, grenades were used a great deal in the trench and position warfare of that conflict. Early in World War I, the British instructed their troops in methods of improvising hand grenades from empty jam tins, filled with explosive and scrap metal, a detonator inserted, and the whole thing wrapped tightly with wire. Then the British developed the Mills Bomb, a lemon-shaped grenade, very similar to those in use today.

But World War I grenades were not the first. Grenades of one sort or another were used long before the Kaiser started his march in 1914. The United States, a relative newcomer in the army business, used grenades in the Revolution, as did the British. Even those were Johnnie-come-lately grenades.

Grenades, in spite of—or perhaps because of—their early origin, have had an up-and-down history. After the Revolution, grenades practically vanished from the scene as the powers-that-be decided that the grenade was outmoded as a weapon. World War I, with its trench warfare and long stalemates, forced the grenade out of retirement and into an improved status.

The grenade, proven to be one of the most valuable of weapons to the individual soldier, is well worth study. It is not enough that the soldier should be able to pull the pin and throw his own type of grenade; he should be able to make use of enemy grenades and those of his allies. Picking up an unknown type of grenade and trying to use it can be a dangerous business. For that reason, every soldier should be interested in the grenades of other countries. The following is a

description of the grenades used by the Red Army soldier. (See "The Red Army Infantryman" in this issue of the *Intelligence Bulletin.*)

Soviet grenades are generally similar to those of most of the other nations. The principle of operation is the same, though the details may differ slightly. There are Russian types that to the casual observer would appear to be just like our own grenades. Other Russian models would remind the ETO vet of the German grenades. Each type presents its own peculiarities.

M1914/30 DUAL-PURPOSE STICK GRENADE

The Red Army's M1914/30 grenade may be recognized by its cylindrical, crimped, sheet-steel head, with a tapering section that joins a metal handle. This handle is slotted on one side, and a firing lever is fitted in this slot. This firing lever, if the grenade is not a dud which has been thrown, will be locked in place by a sliding-ring safety. If the serrated, cast-iron, fragmentation jacket is left on the grenade, it must be used as a defensive grenade, and thrown only from cover. If the fragmentation jacket is removed, the M1914/30 may be utilized as an offensive grenade.

This weapon is issued to Soviet troops without the detonator-delay assembly being assembled to the grenade. To arm the grenade, the safety ring is slipped off the handle, and the firing lever is pressed down into its slot. Then the safety bar, which is positioned at right angles to a slot in the side of the grenade head, is moved until it is in position across the slot, and thereby locks the striker in the cocked position. The safety ring is then replaced on the handle, over the raised section which serves to prevent the safety ring from slipping off the handle. The detonator-delay assembly retaining arm on the head of the grenade is pivoted (another version has a sliding retaining cover) to allow a detonator-delay assembly to be inserted in the detonator pocket. The shorter stem of the detonator-delay assembly fits into



The Soviet M1914/30 Grenade. Essential parts indicated are: (a) safety ring, (b) safety bar, (c) striker arm in uncocked position, (d) detonator delay assembly retaining arm, and (e) firing lever.

the striker well, and the longer stem fits into the detonator well. The detonator-delay assembly must not be inserted into the grenade unless the striker has been cocked and the striker locked in the "safe" position. When the grenade has thus been made ready to be thrown, the handle is grasped with the right hand so that the safety ring is between the middle and ring fingers. With the left hand the safety bar is moved to the unlocked, or "ready," position. The grenade is now ready to be thrown, and the striker is held back only by the claws of the firing lever. As the grenade is thrown, the safety ring is left in the hand and the firing lever snaps out. The striker than drives forward under spring tension, and explodes the primer. The bursting charge detonates after 3.5 to 4 seconds.

To Disarm the M1914/30 DP Stick Hand Grenade

1. The safety bar is moved so as to lock the striker in the cocked position.
2. The detonator-delay assembly is removed from the grenade.
3. The grenade and detonator-delay assembly are kept separate.

Characteristics:

Weight (with fragmentation jacket)	1.8 pounds.
Effective radius (with fragmentation jacket)	15 yards.
Weight (without fragmentation jacket)	1.5 pounds.
Lethal radius (without fragmentation jacket)	10 yards.
Length over-all	9.3 inches.
Diameter of head	1.8 inches.
Time of delay	3.5 to 5 seconds.

RGD 33 HE DUAL-PURPOSE STICK GRENADE

The *RGD 33* HE Dual-Purpose Stick Grenade may be recognized by its cylindrical, crimped, sheet-metal head, and a hollow, stamped, metal handle of smaller diameter which screws into the head. A cast-iron fragmentation jacket may, or may not, be present. The color of recovered specimens is an olive drab. The top surface of the grenade head has a cavity for inserting a detonator-delay assembly.

The grenade and detonator-delay assembly are not assembled when the grenades are issued to Soviet troops. To use, the grenade is grasped by the handle with the right hand, and by the head of the grenade with the left hand. The handle is pulled away from the grenade head until it stops, then the handle is turned to the right as far as it will go, and eased down into position. A red mark will then show to the right of the safety slide on the handle, to indicate the grenade is armed. The safety slide is moved to the right until it covers the red mark. The grenade is then safe. The detonator-delay assembly retaining arm on the head of the grenade is then moved aside



This is the Soviet RGD 33 Hand Grenade. Parts indicated are: (above), (a) red mark, (b) safety slide, (c) detonator delay assembly retaining arm, and (d) fragmentation jacket; (below), (a) detonator well, (b) detonator delay assembly retaining arm, (c) retaining arm catch, and (d) fragmentation jacket in place.



to uncover the detonator pocket. A detonator-delay assembly is inserted with the tapered (primer) end first and pressed home gently with the thumb. Then the retaining arm is moved back to the closed position, and locked in place under the catch provided. To throw the grenade the safety slide is again moved to the left. The red mark is again visible indicating the grenade is armed, and ready for throwing.

The grenade must be thrown with a jerky, vigorous, overhand swing, as this motion is necessary to disengage the handle from its notch so it will snap back to the closed position, thus driving the striker forward and exploding the primer. The primer initiates the delay powder train (3.2 to 4 seconds) after which time the bursting charge of the grenade detonates.

The armed grenade is safe to handle, whether or not the safety slide covers the red mark, as only a vigorous swing causes functioning of the primer. Dud grenades are dangerous to handle, because the striker

may set forward under a slight movement. Accordingly, duds should be destroyed in place.

The armed grenade can be disarmed by putting the safety slide in the safe position. The detonator-delay assembly is then removed. Lastly, the handle is pulled out, turned to the left and eased forward to the closed or unlocked position.

Up to five grenade heads may be bound to a central grenade to give increased blast effect. The *RGD 33* is used as an offensive grenade without the cast-iron fragmentation jacket, and as a defensive grenade with the cast-iron fragmentation jacket.

Characteristics:

Weight (with fragmentation jacket)	1.7 pounds.
Weight (without fragmentation jacket)	1.1 pounds.
Length over-all	7.5 inches.
Diameter of head without fragmentation jacket	2.2 inches.
Time delay	3.2 to 4 seconds.
Effective bursting radius (with fragmentation jacket)	15 yards.
Maximum lethal radius (without fragmentation jacket)	10 yards.
Average throwing range	30 to 40 yards.

RG 1941 HAND GRENADE

The *RG 1941* depends on blast and light fragmentation for effect against personnel. It can be readily recognized by its cylindrical, crimped, sheet-metal body with a hinged cover containing the firing mechanism and a safety lever. This lever is held by a safety cotter pin equipped with a fabric loop, extending down the side of the body.

The grenade is armed by taking it in the right hand so that the slot in the hinged cover faces away from the body. The left hand then moves the protruding catch downward and to the right, so that the catch is in the narrow section of the slot. The hinged cover is opened, and the detonator-delay assembly is then inserted into the detonator pocket, so that the primer end is uppermost. This done, the hinged cover is closed and the protruding catch moved to the left and upward until the catch rests in the wide section of the slot. Thus the grenade is armed.

When used, the grenade is held so that the hand presses the hinged safety lever against the body of the grenade. The safety cotter pin is then removed by pulling on the fabric loop, and the grenade is thrown. If the grenade is not thrown, the safety cotter pin is replaced, and the ends bent out to ensure against the safety cotter pin falling out of the grenade.

When the safety cotter pin is removed, the hinged safety lever is freed. But while the lever is held against the grenade body by the hand, the striker hammer cannot fall on the primer. When the grenade is thrown, the hinged safety lever flies outward, and the forked end of the hinged safety lever, which is inside the cover, releases the striker hammer. The hammer, driven by a compressed spring, then

strikes the primer and initiates the delay train. After 3.2 to 3.8 seconds the flash reaches the detonator and detonates the bursting charge of the grenade.

This grenade is approximately the same weight as the U. S. Offensive Grenade Mk. III A1, and can be thrown 45 to 55 yards. The grenade body has three concentric metal liners inside the outer casing for light fragmentation and the grenade should be utilized accordingly. At close ranges, this grenade should be thrown from cover.

Characteristics:

Weight	14 ounces.
Time delay	3.2 to 3.8 seconds.
Effective bursting radius	15 yards.
Average throwing range	45 to 55 yards.

RTD 42 HAND GRENADE

The Soviet *RTD 42* grenade is used in attack or defense. It can be recognized by its cylindrical, crimped, sheet-metal body which is 3.4 inches long without the fuze assembly. The body is painted gray, or olive drab, and has a yellow stripe. The fuze assembly is somewhat similar in appearance to the fuze assembly on U. S. Fragmentation Grenade Mk. II. The same fuze is used in the Russian F–1 Fragmentation Grenade.

The grenade and fuze assembly are packed separately, the grenade having a shipping plug in place of the fuze assembly. When the grenade is used, the shipping plug is removed from the grenade, and a fuze assembly is inserted in the fuze pocket and screwed in tightly. For throwing, the grenade is held tightly in the hand in such manner that the safety lever is pressed firmly against the body of the grenade and prevented from moving. The safety cotter pin is withdrawn by a pull on the ring, thus removing the obstruction against movement of the safety cap. When the grenade is thrown, release of pressure on the safety lever permits a ball release spring to raise the safety cap, thus letting a locking ball fall out. This releases the striker, which is driven downward by the compressed, striker spring, to function the primer. The safety cap and lever are prevented from leaving the grenade by a locking pin. The primer, located in the delay body, initiates the delay train which, when it has burned through, activates the detonator causing detonation of the bursting charge in 3 to 4.4 seconds.

This grenade is approximately the same weight as that of the U. S. Offensive Grenade Mk. III A1, and like it can be thrown approximately 35 to 40 yards. Grenades found without safety cotter pins should not be handled, but should be destroyed in place.

Characteristics:

Weight	15.3 ounces.
Weight of filler (TNT)	3.9 ounces.
Length over-all	4.6 inches.
Length without fuze assembly	3.4 inches.
Diameter of body	2.2 inches.
Time delay	3 to 4.4 seconds.

F–1 FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADE

The F–1 Fragmentation Hand Grenade may be recognized by its outside resemblance to the U. S. Fragmentation Grenade Mk. II. The fuze assembly has a somewhat different appearance, but it has a safety lever and safety cotter pin very similar to the U. S. grenade mentioned above. The principle of arming, and the functioning of the fuze is, in general, similar to that of the fuze used in the U. S. Fragmentation Grenade.

The grenade and fuze are packed separately in the same container, the grenade having a plastic shipping plug in place of the fuze assembly. To use the grenade, Soviet soldiers remove the shipping plug from the grenade, and insert a fuze assembly in the fuze cavity. The assembly is screwed in tightly. The grenade is held tightly in the hand in such a manner that the safety lever is pressed firmly against the body and prevented from moving. The safety cotter pin is withdrawn by a pull on the ring, removing the obstruction against upward movement of the safety cap. When the grenade is thrown, release of pressure on the safety lever permits a ball release spring to raise the safety cap assembly, permitting the ball to fall out. This releases the striker, which is driven downward by the compressed striker spring to explode the primer. The safety cap and lever assembly are prevented from leaving the grenade by a locking pin. The primer, located in the delay body,



The Red Army's F–1 Hand Grenade is very similar to the standard U. S. counterpart. Indicated here are: (a) safety cotter pin, and (b) safety lever.

initiates the delay train which, when it has burned through, explodes the detonator, thus causing detonation of the bursting charge of the grenade. The average delay is 4.4 seconds.

The weight is approximately that of the U. S. Fragmentation Grenade Mk. II, and like it can be thrown approximately 50 yards. Like the U. S. Mk. II, it should be thrown from cover. Grenades found without safety cotter pins should not be handled, but should be destroyed in place.

RPG 40 ANTITANK STICK HAND GRENADE

The RPG 40 Antitank Stick Hand Grenade can be recognized by its large diameter (3.8 inches), crimped, sheet-metal head painted olive drab, or green, with a paper label pasted on the side. The handle has a safety lever locked in place by a safety cotter pin which is equipped with a fabric tab for pulling the pin out of the handle. There is no cast-iron, fragmentation jacket furnished, this grenade being a demolition grenade which depends upon a heavy explosive charge for effect against armored vehicles with an armor thickness of from 20- to 25-mm (0.79 to 0.98 inch), bunkers, pillboxes, and similar targets. It is only thrown from cover.

The grenade and detonator assembly are not assembled on issue. To prepare the grenade for throwing, the handle is grasped to hold the safety lever firmly against the handle until the grenade is thrown. The detonator-assembly retaining arm is then pivoted on its axis, thus exposing the detonator pocket in the center of the grenade head. Then a detonator assembly is inserted with the smaller (primer) end first, and the retaining arm pivoted back and locked under the catch provided. This prevents the detonator assembly from falling out. Before the grenade is thrown, the fabric tab on the safety cotter pin is pulled to remove the pin from the grenade. The grenade is then thrown, and since it has an all-way impact fuze, it will detonate on striking the target.

As the grenade leaves the hand, the safety lever flies out, thus pulling out a needle that locks the striker assembly in place. The striker assembly sets forward, and safety balls, which hitherto have held the striker immobile, drop out and allow the striker free play. At the same time, a safety bar attached to the safety lever is withdrawn and allows a weight to bear against the rear of the striker assembly. On impact, the weight sets forward under inertia and drives the striker against the primer, thus detonating the bursting charge.

Characteristics:

Weight (fuzed)	1¼ pounds.
Weight of HE filler	2 ounces.
Length over-all	4.6 inches.
Maximum diameter	2$\frac{5}{32}$ inches.
Delay	4.4 seconds (average).
Lethal radius	15 yards.



Indicated on this Soviet RPG–40 Grenade are: (a) detonator delay assembly, (b) the opposite side of the handle in which the safety lever is set, and (c) the retaining arm and detonator well. The cotter pin and tab do not show here.

To disarm the *RPG 40*, the safety lever is held firmly against the hand, and the safety cotter pin is reinserted in the loop in the handle. The ends are then bent out to lock the safety lever in place. The detonator-assembly retaining arm is then pivoted into the open position, and the detonator assembly removed from the grenade head.

Precautions

1. The armed grenade must not be dropped or otherwise subjected to shock.
2. The grenade and the dentonator assembly must be kept separate.

Characteristics:

Weight	2.7 pounds.
Length over-all	7.9 inches.
Diameter of head	3.8 inches.
Effective bursting radius	25 yards.
Average throwing range	25 to 30 yards.

RPG–43 HEAT HAND GRENADE

The *RPG–43* may be recognized by its shaped charge in a cylindrical, crimped, sheet-metal head to which is threaded a wooden handle with a sheet-metal safety lever . This safety lever is the same as the one on the *RPG–40* Antitank Stick Hand Grenade. In addition, a sliding, conical sleeve, open at both ends, is connected to the handle by two long fabric strips. The hole in this sleeve is pushed over the handle, and the sleeve is held up against the base of the head of the

grenade by the safety cotter pin, which also secures the safety lever in the locked position.

The *RPG–43* is a *HEAT* hand grenade used for close combat against enemy armored vehicles whose armor thickness does not exceed 75-mm (2.95 inches). It is thrown only from cover because of the danger from fragments of grenade and armor plate. The effect of this grenade is to burn through the armor, cause casualties to the crew, and ignite fuel and ammunition.

The *RPG-43* HEAT Hand Grenade is issued without the striker assembly being assembled to the grenade. The striker assembly consists of a glass body containing a creep spring and a striker. This should be checked to be sure it is clean, then the creep spring inserted first and the point of the striker inserted through the coils of the creep spring. Unscrew the head of the grenade from the handle. Holding the handle in the left hand, screw the striker assembly on to the threaded striker retainer as far as it will go, and screw the handle and head together again.

To throw the grenade it is taken in the right hand so that the hinged safety lever is held tight against the handle. The safety cotter pin is withdrawn by pulling on its ring. The grenade is thrown and cover is taken immediately after throwing.

When the grenade leaves the hand, the hinged safety lever flies out and off the grenade. The compressed conical-sleeve spring drives the sleeve off the handle, thus pulling the cloth stabilizing strips out to their full extent. The conical sleeve and cloth strips serve to keep the grenade stabilized so the flat surface of the head strikes the target. As the sleeve moves along the handle, it releases the safety pin which locks the striker retainer in the locked position and the safety pin drops out. Now the striker is held away from the primer-detonator only by the creep spring. As the grenade hits the target



The indicated parts of this Red Army RPG–43 Grenade are: (a) conical sleeve, (b) fabric strips, (c) safety cotter pin, and (d) safety lever.

the striker overcomes the inertia of the creep spring, compresses the spring, functions the primer-detonator, and detonates the grenade.

Precautions

1. The grenade is always carried without the striker assembly in place until just before using.
2. The striker assembly should be carried carefully wrapped in paper or rags.
3. Reserve grenades and striker assemblies should be kept in the original containers.
4. The grenade should never be dropped once the safety cotter pin has been removed.
5. Never arm or disarm the grenade with people close by unless absolutely necessary.
6. Be certain the head of the grenade is free from rust. The grenade must be destroyed if rust has eaten through the metal casing of the head.
7. The glass striker assembly should be clean and not broken. The striker and creep spring should be present and working freely.
8. The handle assembly should be complete and in good working order. The conical sleeve should not be dented. The end of the hinged safety lever should keep the sleeve from turning on the handle. The striker retainer should be locked in place by its pin.
9. Defective grenades should not be issued, but should be destroyed.
10. The ends of the safety cotter pin should be bent over to hold the hinged safety lever tightly against the handle.
11. The grenade head or handle assembly must not be disassembled under any circumstances.

Characteristics:

Weight	About 2.65 pounds.
Average throwing range	16 to 21 yards.
Type of Fuze	Instantaneous impact.

M1917 CHEMICAL STICK HAND GRENADE

The M1917 Chemical Stick Hand Grenade may be recognized by its very great similarity of appearance to the M1914/30 Stick Hand Grenade without the cast-iron fragmentation jacket. The only difference is that the M1917 has a triangular metal plate soldered on to the head with inscription "Chemical" written in Russian lettering. The letters "A. O. K. M." are stamped into the handle. The striker assembly is in a metal tube on the side of the grenade instead of being within the grenade body as in the M1914/30.

The grenade is issued without the detonator-delay assembly being assembled to the grenade. To arm the grenade, the safety ring is slipped off the handle and the firing lever pressed down into its slot in the handle. The safety bar, which is positioned at right angles to the slot in the striker assembly tube, is moved until it is in position across the slot and locks the striker in the cocked position. The safety ring is now replaced on the handle, over the raised screw which serves to prevent the safety ring from slipping off the handle during handling. The detonator-delay assembly retaining arm on the head of the grenade is pivoted to allow a detonator-delay assembly to be inserted into the detonator pocket. The shorter (primer) stem of the detonator-delay assembly fits into the striker well and the longer (detonator) stem fits into the detonator well. The detonator-delay assembly must not be inserted unless the striker has been cocked and locked in the "safe" position. When the grenade is ready to be thrown, the handle is grasped with the right hand so that the safety ring is between the middle and ring fingers. With the left hand the safety bar is moved to the unlocked or "ready" position. The striker is now held back only by the claws of the firing lever. As the grenade is thrown the safety ring is left in the hand and the firing lever snaps out. The striker then drives forward under spring tension and functions the primer. The bursting charge detonates and allows the chemical filler access to the air after 3.5 to 4 seconds.

To Disarm the M1917 Chemical Stick Grenade

1. The safety bar is moved so as to lock the striker in the cocked position.



The Soviet M1917 Chemical Grenade has these principal components: (a) striker assembly tube, (b) safety ring, (c) firing lever, (d) location of safety bar, (e) striker (cocked), (f) raised screw, (g) detonator delay assembly retaining arm.

2. The detonator-delay assembly is removed from the grenade.
3. The grenade and detonator-delay assembly are kept separate.

This grenade is used principally for forcing evacuation of enclosed spaces such as pillboxes or bunkers.

Characteristics:

Weight	1.9 pounds.
Weight of filler (chloropicrin)	1.06 to 1.1 pounds.
Length over-all	9.7 inches.
Diameter of head	2.6 inches.
Time delay	3.5 to 4 seconds.

RGD–1 SMOKE HAND GRENADE

The *RDG–1* Smoke Hand Grenade may be recognized by its cardboard body, a little less than one-half the length of which is of reduced diameter in order to serve as a handle. The top and bottom ends are covered with cardboard covers.

Before throwing, the upper and lower cardboard covers are removed by means of the pull tapes provided. The striking surface is moved vigorously over the match head in the center of the top surface of the grenade head. Ten to fifteen seconds after the match head is ignited, the thick gray-black smoke is emitted for about 1½ minutes. As the match head ignites, it in turn ignites a booster composition. The booster ignites a flash pellet in the top of the flash tube which, in turn, ignites two others, positioned in the center and bottom of the flash tube. These flash pellets ignite the smoke mixture, that is emitted through holes bored in the wooden top and bottom plugs of the grenade.

Under favorable weather conditions, the grenade emits a smoke screen between 27 and 33 yards in radius. In winter the grenade should, if possible, be thrown so that it falls on a hard surface such as a road or crusted snow. If the grenade falls in deep powder snow the volume of smoke is greatly reduced.

This grenade may be thrown into water to screen water crossings. If used for this purpose, it should be held in the hand 2 to 5 seconds before being thrown on the water.

The grenade is used to screen friendly troops, and to mask sorties from tanks or armored cars. In each infantry platoon a few men are assigned to carry smoke grenades. The number assigned depends on the mission, screen cover required, wind, and local conditions.

Characteristics:

Weight	18 to 18.3 ounces.
Filling (smoke)	15.8 ounces.
Duration of smoke screen	About 1.5 minutes.
Length of smoke screen	27 to 33 yards.

"S" SMOKE HAND GRENADE

The "S" Smoke Hand Grenade may be recognized by its cylindrical sheet-metal body with a metal lid (marked "S") and a belt hook on the side of the body. Approximately one-third of the grenade body is of reduced diameter apparently to serve as a handle. Little is known of this grenade other than its appearance. Apparently it has a pivoting or sliding cover on the lid for insertion of a detonator-delay assembly or an igniter assembly.

Characteristics:

Weight	1.25 pounds.
Length	6.3 inches.
Diameter	2.75 inches.
Filling	Dark-gray, crumbly mixture of potassium nitrate, ammonium chloride and bitumen (tar).



The Red Army's "S" smoke hand grenade.

FRANGIBLE INCENDIARY GRENADES

Several types of frangible incendiary grenades are used in the Soviet Army They are quite similar in appearance and operation, and are used in the same way to the U. S. M–1 Frangible Grenade with and without the igniter M–3. All use a 1-liter (approximately 1-quart) bottle. They may be filled with KS liquid, white phosporous in an inflammable medium which ignites spontaneously, or with benzine, which requires the use of an igniter placed inside the bottle.

When frangible grenades are thrown against soft snow or soil, pull-type friction igniters and detonators are attached to the bottles to assure breakage. These grenades are utilized against enemy armored vehicles, bunkers, pillboxes, etc.

Characteristics:

All figures are approximations.

Weight	1 to 2 pounds.
Over-all length	10 inches.
Maximum diameter	3 inches.
Average throwing range	25 yards.



The Jerries had a pretty good system for pumping information out of Allied prisoners of war. Sometimes it worked. Most of the time, when Allied prisoners stood on their rights, it didn't work. But in some cases no interrogation system was needed at all—some guys just talked for Jerry free of charge.

Some Americans were nurtured on quiz programs, to judge by the glibness with which a few airmen, shot down over Germany in World War II, answered the questions of German interrogators. This was not an occupational trait of airmen alone, for there are an equal number of cases where U. S. officers and men of all branches, seeming to forget the precombat security lectures they received (or slept through) during training periods, "spilled their guts" when captured later and brought before German intelligence officers.

But purely for purposes of example, consider the interrogation report of the air crew shot down during a daylight mission against Heidelberg in March 1945. Conquest of Germany has brought to light this document, and others like it, on file at an enemy Air Forces interrogation center. The crew of this Marauder bomber revealed enough classified information to fill six pages. They had flown 48 missions, were bursting with ideas and opinions, and spilled them forth willingly, as it would seem from the wealth of detailed statements they handed to the "Jerries," free of charge.

Operational training at Barksdale Field, La., route taken to Sardinia, missions against target in Italy, and finally the pin-point target of Heidelberg railway installations—these were among the topics fully discussed. "At the briefing it was carefully emphasized that under no circumstances was the city itself to be hit. For this reason a rather small formation was used: to prevent any injury to the city from misses," runs the report. There was no alternate target.

The last mission was minutely described—formation, route, weather, bomb load, escort, flak defense. With growing expansiveness, the

fliers revealed that "in general, Marauder formations have little to fear from German flak." This is the enemy's summary of the crew's observations: "By reason of their greater speed in comparison to that of the 4-engine formations, the medium bombers appear over the target quickly and vanish just as quickly, without remaining in the danger zone for any length of time. While the possibility of hits on a plane in a 4-engine formation is estimated at 40 percent (not shot down—merely a hit) the possibility of a hit on a medium bomber is very slight. As an example, the interrogated PWs claim that only once in their previous 48 missions did they return to base with any flak holes."

Chatting freely, the pilot and the navigator, ably assisted by the rest of the crew when their turns came, gave information on the flight to the IP and the bomb run itself; formation and strength; bomb release; navigation and pathfinder operation. They were as frank in revealing what they did *not* have as in boasting of their equipment and achievements: "All attacks were carried out without pathfinders. There were none at the disposal of the —nd Med. Bomb Wing," states the report, going on to say:

"*Loran and Diskus:* Neither of these navigational aids was known to the navigator. He knew the designation "GH" only from hearsay, but was able to say with certainty that Diskus was not in use by the —nd Med. Bomb Wing." Nor did their aircraft have high altitude equipment. Because they never flew over 12,000 feet, even oxygen masks were unnecessary.

From information gathered during interviews, the enemy pieced together a complete picture of current tactical organization. Earlier operations came in for discussion, and the crew revealed what they knew of future plans. They had not heard of a planned conversation from Marauder to Invader, however. "Despite the admitted bad flying characteristics of the B–26, especially on take-off and landing, there was no likelihood of a change in the near future," says the report, which concludes with this statement on B–26 dive bombing: "Some time ago the B–26 was used experimentally for dive bombing. It was used in this manner against a single target in Holland. According to reports all attacking aircraft were shot down because the speed and rate of climb after the bombs were dropped were not sufficient. It can be stated with certainty that in the future the Marauder will be used only for horizontal bombing."

Recreation was considered worth a paragraph: "The Hotel Martinez in Cannes has been requisitioned by the AAF for flying personnel and deserving members of the ground crews. Leaves up to 7 days were given at this rest center. After its thirtieth mission the crew interrogated spent 4 days at the hotel and then returned to Sardinia."

The second lieutenant who served as observer for the crew of a Fly-

ing Fortress shot down in March 1945, east of Schmachtenhagen, turned spokesman at the interrogation. He revealed five closely typed pages of information, including targets he had attacked in the course of 30 missions, and mention of a visit of General Doolittle and a group of Congressmen and Senators to his base at Nuthampstead. He modestly admitted that his squadron was famous for bombing pin-point targets by means of Meddo and GH. He himself had had no training as a radar observer, but many pin-point targets in the Rundstedt offensive area such as a railway and other bridges were successfully bombed by radar. He described one complete failure which cost the squadron its reputation for perfect blind bombing—the radar observer had misread the Meddo indicator and the bomb pattern was correctly laid down but about 8 km. short of the target.

Under the heading "Route of Departure and Rendezvous," the report includes this paragraph:

"Pilots were told that if damage to their aircraft was so severe that a safe return was questionable, they were to head for Russian territory. Special instructions as to which airports were suitable for landings were not given. PW remembers that in a raid on Chemnitz one aircraft left the formation and headed for Russia. Nothing has ever been learned concerning the fate of this aircraft."

German interrogators were ever on the alert for signs of distrust of their allies on the part of Americans. The report of a detailed interview with a staff sergeant, waist gunner on a B–17 shot down the same month, includes this information: "Thus far neither special regulations nor specified landing fields have been designated for emergency landings in Russian territory, although all crews have a justifiable interest in knowing where in the 'Russian Steppes' such landings should be made. . . . The fact that the U. S. S. R. has thus far not been willing to place airfields at the disposal of American heavy bombers in the war with Japan has made for hard feelings because this denial has the effect of lengthening the Pacific war."

Another report ends with this paragraph based on an officer's remarks: "Unlike the people of all other cities in southern and central Italy occupied by the Allies, the population of Grosseto makes no attempt to hide its hatred for the Americans. The American officer thought that 'Mussolini had really done his work in Grosseto.' There have already been frequent clashes between Americans and young Italians. The Americans stationed in Grosseto wish that they could bomb the town to rubble and ashes because of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of the population."

The same officer who recalled that an American plane had been swallowed up in Russia contributed this on RAF–USAAF relations: "RAF officers give regular lectures at Nuthampstead about night operations of the RAF. Participation on the part of American officers

is optional and not very lively. Night operations of the RAF are regarded lightly. This was especially noted when the English bomber formations flew over the base at dusk on their way to Germany. The frequent comment was that in comparison with the orderly American formations, the RAF formations were a disarranged swarm. The fact that formation flying is not practicable at night was not looked upon as an excusing factor by the PW."

In this connection one regrettable fact emerges—a low standard of political consciousness prevailed among the rank and file of the Allied fighting forces. German interrogators were quick to seize on the possibilities of the "divide and conquer" technique. They were frankly surprised at the lack of political education displayed by Allied PW and by the ease with which they were able to parry whatever justification a prisoner tried to advance. Briefly, interrogators presented Germany in a favorable light, outlining the social similarities between Germany and the Allies. Soviet Russia was the butt of many an argument. Americans, said the interrogators, were dying in vain inasmuch as in the event of an Allied victory the Western Powers would find the Bolshevik tyranny a *fait accompli* in Europe. To all this prisoners offered unexpectedly little opposition—simply because of their abysmal ignorance of politics.

German interrogators, later captured by allied troops, have made many suggestions to American authorities—notably that punishing prisoners who had disclosed classified information would have the effect of improving security consciousness on the part of troops still fighting in the Pacific. They did not suggest however, that we should attempt political indoctrination to raise security. Even the Germans felt that this would scarcely work in a democratic population.

If interrogation of captured American troops caused our No. 1 security leak in ETO and Mediterranean Europe, document security was our next greatest means of telling the enemy what he wanted to know. This was attested to by the counterintelligence officer of the German II Paratroop Corps, a lieutenant colonel captured in the Falaise Pocket in August 1944. A highly intelligent officer, one who had served in Corps and Army Headquarters in Poland, France (1940) and Russia, he mentioned particularly that the security of documents in the American Army was absolutely shocking.

Again and again Top Secret documents were found in American PW pockets and in vehicles in the front line. This PW recalled an occasion when he found a Top Secret document giving the complete regrouping of the American forces shortly before the battle of Avranches on an American lieutenant. When he remarked on it to the lieutenant, the latter answered: "Well, you cannot keep all this in your head."

The German officer pointed out that had the Allied Air Forces

permitted them to move their troops at all, this flagrant breach of security would have done us incalculable harm, as many locations and moves of Allied units were exposed well in advance.

As an added comment, the German stated that distribution lists on nearly all documents were one of the most valuable sources of information to the Germans. This officer, by his very helpfulness to an erstwhile enemy—still the enemy of his country—proved the truth of a statement made by a German interrogator who observed: "All security training is wrecked by the human factor."

The Luftwaffe's evaluation center made a report on papers found on the body of Sgt. R, killed in action in the Berlin area in March 1945.

A personal diary contained entries which gave the Germans data concerning target, time and method of attack, bomb load, bomb line, assembly, weather, emergency landing in Russian territory, and fighter position.

In case this seems incredible, an entry in the diary is reproduced:

> *Target:* Berlin, take-off 0644 hours. I got up at 0240 hours, dressed and had breakfast: French toast, syrup, coffee, and oranges. I drew my equipment. The briefing began at 0345 hours. The target for today is a marshalling yard in the city of Berlin. It was expected to be a visual attack but they also reckoned with the possibility of having to bomb through an overcast (Meddo). Heavy flak was expected over the target. Our bomb load is 12 x 45 RDK HE bombs and 8 incendiary clusters (M–17) 225 kg each. (Total load according to this 2.34 tons.) We were to bomb no target east of 12° or west of 8°. (This indicated that the east front had pushed westward—compare this with the document evaluation of Detachment Stendal, Crash Report No. VE 1/45 dated 18 March 1945 A. d. A.) In case we have to make an emergency landing behind the Russian lines our recognition signal to the Russians is to dip the left wing 3 to 5 times. Our fighter escort is to pick us up as we cross 7° long. We taxied onto Runway 24 and took off in a SW direction just as the dawn began. We flew through a thin cloud cover into a clear sky. The sun was just rising over the horizon. Assembly began. The high box was in formation at 1850 hours. We put on our oxygen masks at 0810 hours at an altitude of 4300 m. Our operational group crossed the English coast at 0900 hours.

The papers of 1st Lt. L, taken prisoner in the Müncheberg area in March 1945, contained a list of 38 check points with code numbers given out by the operations officer of the —rd Bomb Group, dated 1 February 1945. Said the German Evaluation Report, "These are apparently points which are repeatedly used in operations against Germany (possibly also turning points). These code numbers may be used in radio communication as well as on papers carried on operations. The frequent use of lakes as check points, especially specific points on a lake, is worthy of notice."

The value of this information to the Luftwaffe, with both inter-

ceptor squadrons and AA under its command, does not need emphasis here.

German interrogators agreed that the only possible way to resist interrogation was to say parrotwise: "My name is Smith, my rank is so-and-so, my number is such-and-such." A man who did this was regarded as a hopeless case and the interrogators' commitments being what they were, the PW was dumped in a permanent camp. As a matter of fact, very few prisoners were able to stick to this formula but the official instruction is the perfect one and the one at which security education should aim.

The success of rigid adherence to the name, rank, and number formula is shown by the story of a British PW interrogator who was captured in June 1944 by the Germans in Italy. This man endured 9 days solitary confinement and approximately 20 days interrogation by the Gestapo, during which time he was manacled, without ever departing from his original statement "My name is H—, my rank is Flight Lieutenant, and my number is such and such." He was finally dumped in a permanent camp WITHOUT THE GERMANS EVER DISCOVERING THAT HE WAS AN INTERROGATOR.

The interrogation staff tried for 9 days to shake this resolution and for the last 3 of these days had him handcuffed continuously. A guard entered the cell every half hour during the night and switched on the light. He had no opportunity to wash or shave during these 9 days, and maintains that the heating of the cell produced acute discomfort after 2 hours. This was altered, however, as soon as he complained. At the end of 9 days he was told that he had lost his chance of being treated as a bona fide prisoner of war, and was then conveyed to the criminal prison at Frankfurt, where solitary confinement continued for a further 3 weeks. From there he was taken periodically to the S. S. Headquarters in Frankfurt and interrogated.

He was assailed by a long campaign of threats culminating in the statement, after about 20 days, that he was to be taken to Berlin and probably eventually to be hanged. His morale remained unshaken, however, even when he was confronted by the escort which was to take him to Berlin, and a receipt for him had been exchanged. His destination, however, turned out to be an ordinary PW Stalag, for the Gestapo, like the earlier interrogators, had bluffed their last trump and lost.

This officer was in due course repatriated and has himself interrogated some of the men who handled him in Germany. This glowing example of a prisoner who refused to speak is the greatest possible vindication of the basic security rule "Name, Rank, and Serial Number"—ONLY!

PUNISHMENT
BY EXAMPLE

Many Americans, whether they like it or not, are going to reside among the defeated German population for some time to come. This article, from the USFET *Weekly Intelligence Summary*, gives an insight to the attitude of the German people, and points toward a pattern of action to be followed by our occupying forces.

During the past months we have all seen the *Herrenvolk* in tears. This is not a pretty sight, and merely demonstrates again the often repeated phrase that "a German is either at your knees or at your throat." It is doubtful if any nation subdued by the Germans acted in a manner as undignified. Lest this apparent show of softness deceive us, lest the loveliness of the German countryside—if not the climate—make us soft, lest the inherent good nature and inborn spirit of tolerance with which we are brought up blind us, it is mete that we at this time inquire into the nature of the beast. As a result of this inquiry it is hoped to arrive at some causes of behavior which will, to our own intellectual satisfaction, supplement those laid down in official orders.

All general statements are open to strong objections. This is particularly true of a general statement regarding the entire people of a nation and even more true of the peoples of the German *Reich*, with their diverse historical and cultural backgrounds, than, say, of the homogeneous French. And yet the French are characterized as a "gay nation" to the astonishment of all who know the dour Provinces of the North and the phlegmatic Bretons. How much harder, then, it is to generalize about the Germans.

Nevertheless certain general statements are valid: As a nation the

Germans have, in part, lost their ability to think for themselves. This being true the Germans have lost, if they ever possessed, their political sense. Too often the inquiry as to the future of Germany is answered by the statement that a new leader must be found. While the Germans lack initiative to a painful degree, once given an order they show great ingenuity in carrying it out. In this fact lies the only glimmer of hope for the future.

In fact this inability to think lies in their faulty political and social education. The older people who remember the political regime of Imperial days dimly recall the time when, without disorder or economic distress, both sides of a political question might have been presented. Those under 50 do not. That opposition to an established Government is even permissible, let alone desirable, is an entirely new concept to the middle-aged group, and one which the present elections are presenting to the people in a concrete way for the first time in many years. This concept being placed before a middle-aged group, no one of them is able in this connection adequately to evaluate it by ordinary thought process. They simply do not have the basis for comparison.

Yet in a vague and wholly unreasoning way they, for the most part, have concluded that the Nazi regime was not a good thing. This conclusion is widespread among all but the fanatics and in the "lunatic fringe." It comes from evidence of the senses. The Germans see wrecked cities, burned villages, former prisoners of war, and conclude that no regime which ended in these could have been good or right.

Religious by nature and upbringing, the pious have concluded beyond doubt that this time God was not on their side. But in the savagery of the regime they claim no knowledge, feel no responsibility and evidence no interest. All this was beyond their ken, without the realm of their proper speculation, a subject not fit for the *Kleiner Mann* (little man) even though he belong to a *Herrenvolk*. This attitude goes back to their inability to think for themselves and to their actual delight in doing what they are told.

The theory of race and blood has left its mark. While admitting that it must have been fallacious—("or why else are you here as conquerers?"—the nation is still thought of as a single race, as single blood and a single *Volk*. "What else could it be?", they ask. If one explains the different races and peoples and blood which make up the United States they shrug their shoulders. Yes, their theory may be wrong, but what is there to take its place?

It may be doubted whether the average German knew the shocking conditions which prevailed in the concentration camps. How many Americans, for example, actually have any idea of conditions in American penal institutions? Nevertheless it is true that the average law

abiding German was a great deal closer to the concentration camp than the average law abiding American is to a penitentiary. "Yes," one German said, "we of course knew that these places existed before the war, but the difficulty was to know that X had been put in concentration camp Y and what specific acts were actually performed at such a place. Many details we could never learn. It was only after officers and men returning from Russia described what was being done to the people there that some of us guessed."

But that many people did know is indisputable. These were *active* party members, for all Germans were Nazis. (They had to be and most of them enjoyed it.) The SS knew, the higher central and provincial officials knew. They are all guilty and the excuse that they did as they were told holds no water. And the whole people are guilty to the extent that they still believe that doing what one is told is adequate excuse for any excess. Judged on this basis—and it seems a fairly detached and fair basis—all the German people were guilty, and are being punished.

But before considering the punishment one more fact should be noted. It has material bearing on the punishment itself. Being unable to think, on what basis does the German believe? Heretofore, on the basis of what he was told, which meant on the basis of national—i. e., party—propaganda. But even this is no longer true. Before entering the heart of Germany we had already seen evidences of this. The German soldier at the time of the Ardennes offensive often could not believe the communiques issued by his own headquarters although at the beginning such communiques did not exaggerate German successes. The German is now more confused. He had begun to doubt, as weakness, what he had been told about the fundamentals of our Democracy. These we now confirm as a source of strength. What he had been taught to regard as contemptuous we now expect him to praise, and what he though to be a propaganda lie we confirm as a fact. The result is to trust less and less the written and spoken word. With this double failure of propaganda becoming more and more apparent each day, this means of education has been left weakened and uncertain.

That the Germans must be punished for all the sorrow and brutality they have made known to the world is incontrovertible. Yet how can this be done? Obviously to punish each citizen of an entire nation is impractical and undesirable. *Adequately* to punish, without resorting to the very savagery we condemn, is difficult. The temptation to do this is overwhelming. Yet of the few precepts which we must in our memory keep—unless civilization is to perish in this world—the first and foremost is that under *no* conditions, under *no* provocation, for *no* reason can we act as the German has acted. To do so would make our war effort meaningless, and in the end the Germans would have conquered. The danger of doing this is more real than apparent.

The whole world was shocked when the town of Lidice was razed to the ground because the Czechs had harbored there members of the Resistance. Could we afford, then, to level an entire town from which a sniper fired at our troops? The world was again shocked when Germans shot American PWs near Malmedy last December. Could we, then, have allowed ourselves to refuse to take prisoners? These two examples suffice to show how close to the surface is the possibility that we may have acted like the Germans.

Next we must insure that our laws and ordinances be administered with speed, with fairness and with decision. Severity with justice is far more effective than leniency with capriciousness. The argument that Germans understand only harshness and force must be eschewed, and if *our* concept of civilization is to survive, the Germans must be made to understand justice and right. In view of their present inability to think, this can be done only by example. If we do not stoop to German methods we may be able to raise this unthinking and degraded people to ours. They must respect us. They must, if need be, be made to respect us. And they can only be made truly to respect us by our own disinterestedness, by our own tolerance, by our justice, and by our sincere desire to do right; to spare the innocent and to seek out and to punish the guilty. The touchstone to this respect is dignity. From dignity and aloofness and the sincere love of justice will come respect and the wish for a better world and a better life. Without these we will sink to the level of the German rather than to raise him up to ours.

This does not imply that those who are responsible for the dreadful things we have witnessed, and to which our attention recently has been called, shall escape. Each and every German who on his own initiative gave, or without protest carried out, an order resulting in those things which shock civilization must be hunted down, be fairly tried and if found guilty, shot or otherwise punished. German industry must never again be permitted to equip another army or to build or plan such primitive horrors as the robot bomb. The people must again find the land and an agricultural economy. They must work in order to live. But they themselves must be allowed to accomplish all this with human dignity for which this war has been fought.

The objection may be made that this outline of conduct for ourselves be idealistic and impossible of achievement. It is nothing of the sort. It can be translated into the ordinary actions of everyday life; into smartness and cleanliness of the troops; into justice and lack of prejudice in the military courts; into a wholesale respect for the private property and civil rights of the conquered, as laid down by our laws; into aloofness without rudeness, bullying, or arrogance. It can be done and must be done.

The German people exist today in an intellectual vacuum. Before they can become morally healthy again they must learn to think. These lessons are even now beginning. Because they respect our strength they will examine and imitate our conduct, which they believe is the source of our strength. Therefore our conduct must be exemplary. It must be exemplary without arrogance in order that it may be aspired to, copied, and then shared. When this happens, and the good and decent life is understood by our enemies, the punishment of the German people will have been complete.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946



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